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Abstract
We develop a tractable model in which trade is generated by asymmetry in agents’
information sets. We show that, even if news are not generated by a stochastic volatil-
ity process, in the presence of information treatment and/or order processing costs,
the (unique) equilibrium price process is characterised by stochastic volatility. The
intuition behind this result is simple. In the presence of trading costs and dynamic in-
formation, agents strategically choose their trading times. Since new (constant volatil-
ity) information is released to the market at trading times, the price process sampled
at trading times is not characterised by stochastic volatility. But since trading and
calendar times diﬀer, the price process at calendar times is the time change of the
price process at trading times – i.e. price movements on the calendar time scale are
characterised by stochastic volatility. Our closed form solutions show that: i) volatility
is autocorrelated and is a non-linear function of both number and volume of trades; ii)
the relative informativeness of numbers and volume of trades depends on the sampling
frequency of the data; iii) volatility, the limit order book, and liquidity, in terms of
tightness, depth, and resilience, are jointly determined by information asymmetries and
trading costs. The model is able to rationalise a large set of empirical evidence about
stock market volatility, liquidity, limit order books, and market frictions, and provides
a natural laboratory for analysing the equilibrium eﬀects of a ﬁnancial transaction tax.
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1 Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial turmoil has renewed the academic interest in understanding whether,
and how, ﬁnancial risk is endogenously generated in the marketplace. Moreover, policies
intended to reduce ﬁnancial market volatility, and possibly increase market liquidity, have
come to the forefront of the economic and political discourse. In particular, in the form
of a ﬁnancial transaction tax – aka a Tobin tax – as a device for throwing sand in the
wheels of the ﬁnancial market. We contribute to this discourse by developing a (dynamic)
equilibrium theory of ﬁnancial market volatility, liquidity, and limit order book, in which
stochastic volatility is endogenously generated (even if economic fundamentals and infor-
mation ﬂows have constant variance) by the strategic interaction of agents endowed with
diﬀerent information about the fundamental value of a ﬁnancial asset.
In the (noisy rational expectation) equilibrium setting we consider, volatility, liquidity (in
terms of tightness, depth, and resilience), and the limit order book, are jointly determined
by the degree of asymmetric information and trading frictions on the market. Moreover, the
equilibrium price process of the traded risky assets is characterised by self-exciting dynamics
even though fundamental values are not.
Our model provides micro foundations for a large set of ﬁnancial markets empirical reg-
ularities such as: a) the presence of time varying, and clustering, volatility for the price of
risky assets; b) a large set of stylised facts on the link between return volatility and market
volume, as well as between volatility and number of trades; c) the evidence that market
volatility is increasing, and liquidity decreasing, in the degree of trading costs and adverse
selection; d) the contemporaneous occurrence of volatility spikes and liquidity dry-ups; e)
the empirical link between frequency of trading activity, price impact of trades, and the
dynamics of price adjustments to new information releases.1
We consider an asymmetric information sequential trading framework a` la Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) (see also e.g. Easley and O’Hara (1987), Glosten (1989), Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009)), with several additional novel, and salient, features. First, we allow for
the endogenous determination of the volume of trade by considering a (competitive) market
maker that can post a complete price schedule as a function of the order size of each trader’s
demand. In this formulation, the market maker can be thought of as representing the total
limit order book of the market. Second, we let (informed, and less informed – aka “noisy”)
traders to freely choose whether and how much to trade with the market maker. Third, we
consider both dynamic information and trade frictions (the latter in the form of a propor-
1See e.g. Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992), Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994), Ane´ and Geman (2000),
Benston and Hagerman (1974), Amihud and Mendelson (1989), Keim and Madhavan (1996), Loeb (1983),
Kavajecz (1999), Umlauf (1993), Hiemstra and Jones (1994), Andersen (1996), Chan and Fong (2000),
Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992), Farmer and Lillo (2004), Dufour and Engle (2000), Jones and Seguin
(1997).
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tional trading cost i.e. analogous to a ﬁnancial transaction tax and/or an order processing
cost). Fourth, we relax the canonical sequential trading assumption of ﬁnancial markets
being observed at discrete exogenous intervals by considering a limiting market in which the
potential traders arrival rate goes to inﬁnity, hence approximating a continuously observed
ﬁnancial market, but with trading activity still happening at discrete – endogenously deter-
mined, yet stochastic – points in time, as in real world markets. Fifth, we characterise the
equilibrium dynamics of the price process in both trade and calendar time scales, and at
several frequencies (the tick-by-tick, medium, low and ultra-low frequencies), by developing
a novel approach that relies on the asymptotic characterisation of the equilibrium market dy-
namics sampled at diﬀerent frequencies and on diﬀerent time scales. This allows us to show
that the equilibrium has market invariance properties in the sense of Kyle and Obizhaeva
(2011a, 2001b).
In the market we consider, two assets are traded: a riskless security, and a risky one
with ﬁnal payoﬀ determined by a continuous stochastic process. The market is populated
by three types of agents. First a (risk neutral) specialist dealer (market maker) that, at any
point in time, can post a complete price schedule (for any order size) at which she stands
ready to trade the risky security – i.e. she chooses the entire limit order book. The specialist
does not observe directly the stochastic process driving the fundamental value of the assets,
and has to infer it from the history of prices, numbers, and volume of trade. Second, there is
a continuum with unit mass of (market order) traders that sequentially arrive to the market
according to a weakly exogenous stochastic counting process2 (characterised by an arrival
intensity parameter that we will be sending to inﬁnity in order to approximate a continuously
observed market). The (risk neutral) market order traders are of two types. A fraction q
of them is of the uninformed (noisy trader) type, while 1 − q of them observe directly the
continuous stochastic process determining the fundamental value of the risky asset. The
share of uninformed traders, as well as agents’ preferences and all the past history of trade
price, time, and volume, are common knowledge.
Upon arrival, a trader observes the price schedule posted by the market maker and,
based on her valuation of the asset, decides whether to trade, and how much, at the posted
prices. If a trade occurs, the market maker updates her valuation of the asset based on
the information that can be inferred from the market order posted by the last trader (i.e.
the trader’s valuation and the posterior probability of her being of the informed type) and,
consequently, she updates the bid and ask pricing schedules. Like in real world markets, the
market maker observes the trader’s arrival if and only if the trader decides to trade (i.e. she
2We require the arrival process to be independent only conditional on the information revealed by the
last trade, i.e. we require only weak exogeneity of the arrival process rather than the strong exogeneity (or
process independence) commonly assumed in sequential trading models. This implies that, in principle, the
arrival process could depend on the past trading history.
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does not observe directly the arrival process) and does not know whether a trader is of the
informed or noisy type (hence she has to form posterior beliefs about the trader’s type).
In order to introduce a trading friction in this market, we assume that a (small) propor-
tional trading cost is associated with each trade (as e.g. in Stambaugh (2014)). Without
loss of generality, we assume that this trading cost is incurred by the market maker. Al-
ternatively, we could have modelled the friction in the form of a minimum order size, and
this would have preserved all the key equilibrium mechanics. Nevertheless, the proportional
trade cost formulation has two important advantages. First, it is analogous to a Tobin Tax
for ﬁnancial transactions, hence it allows us to study the equilibrium eﬀect of such a tax.
Second, it makes the theoretical predictions of our model comparable with the empirical
literature that has extensively modelled and estimated transaction cost speciﬁcations of this
form.
The presence of a trade friction is crucial in order to generate a bid-ask spread for small
orders: without such friction the limit of the ask and bid (equilibrium) price functions, as
the order size approaches zero, would be identical i.e. there would be no a bid-ask spread
in the proximity of zero even though the market maker faces an adverse selection problem
when trading with informed traders.3 Note that the equilibrium bid-ask spread is, as one
would expect, increasing in the degree of adverse selection faced by the market maker. In
turn, the bid-ask spread is crucial for endogenously generating time varying volatility. The
reason behind this mechanism is quite intuitive in our settings. Prices are, in equilibrium, a
mapping from the market maker’s valuation process of the asset to the real line. Therefore,
for asset returns to exibit heteroscedasticity, one needs the conditional and unconditional
distributions of information, revealed by the trading activity, to be diﬀerent. The bid-ask
spread delivers this by generating an inertia region for an informed trader since, whenever her
valuation is within the bid-ask spread, she optimally decides not to trade. As a consequence,
the pool of information incorporated into prices changes depending of whether informed
agents are in the inertia region or not.
The above implies that, changing the bid and ask price schedules, the market maker
changes the distribution of information incorporated into prices. Moreover, since the market
maker, upon receiving an order, never knows for certainty whether the trader is informed
or uninformed, her evaluation of the asset evolves gradually (and stochastically, since it is
“noised up” by both the noisy traders’ activity and the continuous processes driving the fun-
damental value). This in turn generates an equilibrium price process that is autocorrelated
and that shows stochastic clustering of volatility.
A natural way of forming intuition about the equilibrium dynamics of the model is to
3In Glosten and Milgrom (1985) the friction that, in the presence of adverse selection, generates the
bid-ask spread, is the assumption of a ﬁxed order size for all trades.
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Figure 1: Market time scales.
consider the three diﬀerent time scales underlying our market. These are depicted in Figure
1. The ﬁrst (uppermost) time scale is the arrival time one, on which potential traders arrive
to the market and observe the limit order book posted by the market maker. Upon arrival,
based on their valuation and the current available price schedules, traders decide whether to
trade or not. Trades then occur sequentially on the trade time scale (the middle one in the
ﬁgure). If they decide to trade, agents reveal their own valuation of the asset via the order
size they post, and this information gets incorporated into prices and into the updated bid
and ask price schedules that the market maker posts. Note that, on the trade time scale,
prices are adapted to overall information process in the market. Therefore, if there is no
stochastic and clustering volatility in the fundamental information process, there won’t be
stochastic and clustering volatility on the trade time scale. Nevertheless, on the calendar
time scale, due to the traders’ endogenous decision of whether to trade or not upon arrival,
the price process will be a time change of the process on the trade by trade time scale – i.e.
price movements on the calendar time scale are characterised by stochastic volatility, due to
the clustering of information revealed by the trading process.4
We show that, at the tick-by-tick (high) frequency, price movements and volatility are
driven (in a non-linear fashion) by the (equilibrium) volume of trade process. This result
is quite intuitive since, at very high frequency (i.e. trade by trade) the market maker’s
4For the representation of a price process with stochastic volatility via time change (aka time deformation)
see e.g. Mandelbrot and Taylor (1967), Clark (1973), Tauchen and Pitts (1983), Yor, Madan, and Geman
(2002), Andersen, Bollerslev, and Dobrev (2007).
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valuation update (hence the information that is incorporated into prices) is driven by the
order size posted by traders. Moreover, the link between price movements and volume, as
well as the closed form relationship between these quantities that we obtain, are consistent
with the empirical ﬁndings of a large body of literature.5
Considering the sequence of market equilibria as the (possibly time varying) intensity of
traders’ arrival approaches inﬁnity, we identify what we refer to as the medium frequency
equilibrium price process. This is the frequency at which the market is close to being
continuously observed by potential traders. Obviously, in the real world, this frequency
will be asset speciﬁc (e.g., in a given calendar time interval, blue chip stocks are closer to
being continuously observed by traders than a stock at the bottom of the NYSE market
capitalisation distribution), and will be driven by the stock speciﬁc characteristic business
time. That is, sending the arrival intensity to inﬁnity we identify an equilibrium price process
that is of the market microstructure invariance type (see e.g. Kyle and Obizhaeva (2011a,
2001b)). More precisely, ﬁnancial assets with the same level of transaction costs, asymmetric
information, fundamental volatility and drift will have the same equilibrium price process
distributions at medium frequency. Nevertheless, what this frequency will correspond to in
calendar time (hours, days, moths, etc.) will be asset speciﬁc and will depend upon the level
of market attention dedicated to the assets.
At this medium frequency the trade by trade volatility is increasing in both the level
of transaction costs and the degree of adverse selection faced by the market maker. This
is due to the fact that, as these market frictions increase, market tightness and resilience
reduce. The ﬁrst eﬀect reduces the amount of trading (via reduced liquidity and increased
no trade region) while the second makes large departures from fundamental values more
likely and persistent. These eﬀects imply that, when informed traders choose to trade, price
corrections are more severe. From a Tobin Tax perspective, this result implies that such a
tax: a) increases trade by trade variance overall, and its eﬀect is more severe in markets
with a high level of adverse selection; b) reduces volatility in periods of small shocks to the
fundamental value (i.e. in tranquil times), since conditional on small shocks the market will
be more often in the no trade region; c) substantially increases volatility in hectic periods
i.e. when large shocks to fundamental values occur.
Even though, as our sequential framework approaches a continuously observed market,
the trade by trade volatility becomes constant, the calendar time scale volatility is time
varying in a stochastic manner. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that, as depicted in Figure
5See e.g. Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992) that, using a non linear speciﬁcation, ﬁnd a strong link
between volume of trade and price movements, as well as Farmer and Lillo (2004) and Farmer, Lillo, and
Mantegna (2003), that identify a log-linear relationship between gross price growth and changes in volume,
and Potters and Bouchaud (2003), that identify a log-log relationship between gross price growth and volume
changes. We show that in our framework all these relationships between price growth and volume can arise
in equilibrium depending on the market’s fundamental characteristics.
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1, trades in the calendar time scale are endogenously clustered. This intuition is conﬁrmed by
our (asymptotic) closed form solution that shows that, at low frequency (i.e. the frequency
characterised by a large number of trades per time interval), the stochastic volatility of the
price process is driven by the number of trades process, and this dependency is exactly of
the type identiﬁed empirically by Ane´ and Geman (2000).
Our framework also delivers a (closed form) equilibrium characterisation of the drivers of
market liquidity in terms of tightness, deepness, and resilience. In particular, we ﬁnd that,
as the degree of adverse selection increases, tightness is reduced, market impact increases
(for small order sizes), and departures of the price from the fundamental value are expected
to last longer. Moreover, since volatility (on all time scales), increases with adverse selection,
our framework can rationalise the joint occurrence of liquidity dry-ups and volatility spikes
(as e.g. during the subprime crises).
Given the ability of our model to rationalise several salient features of asset price dy-
namics – such as the empirical link between volatility and volume and number of trades, the
common dynamics of volatility and liquidity, as well as the relationship between market fric-
tions and trading activity – it constitutes a natural laboratory for analysing the equilibrium
eﬀects of the introduction of a Tobin Tax. On this front, we show that the introduction of
a Tobin tax has strong eﬀects on both volatility and liquidity. In particular, our model pre-
dicts, consistently with the empirical literature,6 that such a tax would substantially reduce
liquidity (in terms of tightness and resilience), increase volatility, and slow down the business
clock of the market. Furthermore, these eﬀects are stronger in markets characterised by a
high degree of adverse selection – i.e. the eﬀect of a Tobin Tax would be more dramatic
in already illiquid and highly volatile markets. Moreover, we show that such a tax would
reduce volatility in “good times” (i.e. when only small shocks to fundamental are realised)
and increase volatility in “hectic times” (i.e. when large fundamental shocks occur).
More broadly, our work is also related to the large literature on information aggregation
in ﬁnancial market and noisy rational expectation equilibria (see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980), Hellwig (1980), Admati (1985), Kyle (1985), and Wang (1993, 1994), Easley and
O’Hara (1987, 2004)). In particular, since we study a sequence of market equilibria as the
intensity of potential traders arrival goes to inﬁnity, our work is related to Back and Baruch
(2004) that studies the limiting behaviour of a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) type model
as uninformed trades become smaller and arrive more frequently, while the (single) insider
chooses optimally when to trade. In this setting, the authors show, there is an equilibrium
in which informed and uninformed traders arrive probabilistically, as we assume. Our model
departs from their setting in that we do not restrict the order size to be constant (and
shrinking to zero as the intensity of arrivals goes to inﬁnity). This allows us to obtain, in
6See e.g. Umlauf (1993), Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994), Jones and Seguin (1997), and Hau (2006).
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closed form, the equilibrium order book and market depth as a function of the order size.
Moreover, we consider dynamic information and characterise the behaviour of the equilibrium
price and volatility processes at diﬀerent frequencies.
Furthermore, given our focus on the role of ﬁnancial frictions and transaction taxes, our
work is closely connected, respectively, to Vayanos and Wang (2012), and Subrahmanyam
(1998) and Buss, Uppal, and Vilkov (2014).
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the trading and
information structure of the market, as well as the agents’ optimisation problems. Section
3 solves for the market equilibrium and characterises the resulting properties of the order
book, the optimal trading behaviours, and the prices process on diﬀerent time scales and at
various frequencies. In Section 4 we analyse the equilibrium properties of market liquidity
and volatility, while Section 5 concludes. Additional proofs and technical results are reported
in the Appendix.
2 Model Primitives
All random variables are deﬁned on a ﬁltered probability space
(
Ω,F , (Fs)s≤T ,P
)
satisfying
the usual conditions. A remark about the notation used throughout the paper is worth
making at this point. Since we are dealing with three diﬀerent time scales – calendar time,
number of arrival time, and number of trade time – processes need to be deﬁned accordingly.
For all processes we follow the convention that: i) upper case Latin letters, such as Xt,
denote processes considered on the calendar time scale; ii) lower case Latin letters, such as
xi, denote processes considered on the number of arrivals time scale, that is xi = Xθi , where
θi denotes the stopping time of the arrival process (i.e. the i-th arrival time); iii) lower case
Latin letters with ˜ superscript, such as x˜i, denote processes considered on the number of
trade time scale, that is x˜i = Xτi , where τi denotes the stopping time of the trade process
(i.e. the i-th trade time).
2.1 Market Structure
We consider a ﬁnite trading horizon T . There are two assets: a riskless bond that yields the
instantaneous return r, and a risky asset – a stock – with ﬁnal value given by eDT where D
is the continuous log proﬁt process of the ﬁrm and follows the diﬀusion process
dDt = μdt+ σdW
d
t , D0 = const,
7
where W d is a Brownian Motion with respect to (Ft), and μ and σ are, respectively, the drift
and volatility parameters. Note that the framework considered in this paper can be easily
extended to allow for time varying μ and σ, and/or allow D to represent a best estimate,
rather than the true process.
The risky asset is traded in a competitive specialist (“market maker”) market. The
trading structure is a sequential one as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Traders arrive to the
market and meet the specialist according to a stochastic counting process, N , with associated
stopping times θi = inf {t ≥ 0 : Nt = i} where θi is the time of the i-th arrival. We assume
that the total number of arrivals is ﬁnite, and that future arrivals are independent from the
past events.7 We will refer to this assumption as:
A1. NT < ∞ a.s. and σ {Nθi+t −Nθi , t ≥ 0} ⊥ Fθi for all i.
When the trader arrives to the market at time θi, she observes bid, Bθi (·), and ask,
Aθi (·), prices per-share posted by the specialist. We allow the bid and ask prices per-share
to depend on the order size (v). The specialist is allowed to change bid prices, Bt (v
−) (where
v− ∈ R+ is the sell order size) and ask prices, At (v+) (where v+ ∈ R+ is the buy order size),
at any point except at the time at which the trader arrives. That is, as in real markets,
the ask and bid quotes posted by the market maker constitute a non renegotiable trading
commitment at the time at which traders decide to trade.
Given the above formulation, the market maker’s posted prices can also be interpreted
as orders place by competitive limit order traders, and the posted price schedules Bt (v
−)
and At (v
+) can be interpreted as the time t limit order book.
We assume that the market maker has to incur a (small) proportional order processing
cost for each transaction, δ. That is, if at time t the trader submitted the order to buy v+
(or order to sell v−) then the market maker would receive v+At (v+) (1− δ) (or spend the
amount v−Bt (v−) (1 + δ)).
After observing the posted bid and ask prices, the trader that arrived at time θi has to
decide her order size, vi. Obviously, the trader can choose an order size of zero – in which
case no trade occurs, and the specialist does not observe the i-th arrival. That is, as in the
real world, the market maker will observe only the trades and not the arrivals of traders
per se. The cumulative number of realised trades by time t deﬁnes the stochastic counting
process
Lt =
∞∑
i=1
1{θi≤t}∩{vi =0}
where 1{.} is the indicator function deﬁned over a set. We deﬁne the stopping time associated
with the number of trade process, L, as τi = inf {t ≥ 0 : Lt = i} – that is, τi is the time of
7Additional assumptions on the Nt process will be outlined later. For instance, a Poisson process (with
constant or time varying intensity) would satisfy these assumptions.
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the i-th trade. Similarly, we deﬁne the cumulative volume of trade by time t as
Vt =
∞∑
i=1
vi1{θi≤t}. (1)
Let v˜i indicate the order size of the i-th trade that is:
8 v˜i =
∑∞
j=1 vj1{θj=τi}. Since trades
always have to happen either at the bid price, Bτi (·), or at the ask price, Aτi (·), the price
at which the i-th trade is executed is given by9
p˜i = Aτi
(
v˜+i
)
1{v˜i>0} +Bτi
(
v˜−i
)
1{v˜i<0}, (2)
since the trade has to occur either at the ask or at the bid price, and the price at time t is
given by
Pt = p˜max{i≥1: τi≤t}1{τ1≤t} + p˜01{τ1>t}. (3)
Note that the above formulation of Pt is needed to accommodate the case of no trades before
time t, and p˜0 is an equilibrium price that we will derive below.
2.2 Information Structure
Beside the specialist – the “market maker” – there are two types of traders: informed ones
and uninformed noisy traders. Jointly, informed and noisy traders constitute a continuum
with unit mass, are assumed to act competitively. The informational advantage of the ﬁrst
group is that it observes directly the D process.
To characterise the diﬀerent information sets we introduce the following notation: for any
given process X, we denote by FXt = σ {Xs, s ≤ t} ∨ N , where σ {.} is the sigma algebra
generated by its argument, N is the set of P-null sets, and x ∨ y indicates the minimum
sigma algebra generated by the union of x and y.
At time t all the agents observe: a) all the past history of market prices (that is the
ﬁltration FPt generated by the price process P up to time t), and b) all the past history of
the cumulative volume (that is the ﬁltration FVt generated by the volume process V ). This
implies that the cumulated number of trade at time t, Lt, is also known to all the market
participant since it is equal to the number of jumps of {Vs}s≤t. We denote this common
knowledge ﬁltration as
GMt = FPt ∨ FVt .
We use the superscript M to denote the fact that GMt is also the information set of the
specialist market maker.
8Note that Vt =
∑∞
i=1 v˜i1{τi≤t}.
9Recall that, by deﬁnition, v˜i 	= 0.
9
For future convenience, we also deﬁne the market maker’s information set at the time
of the i-th trade: H˜Mi = GMτi . Note that through the paper we use the letter G to denote
information sets in calendar time, the letter H˜ to denote information sets in trading time,
and H to denote information sets in the arrival time scale (i.e. Hi = GMθi ).
The trader who arrived at time θi is of the (uninformed) noisy type (U) with probability
q and of the informed type (I) with probability 1 − q. We deﬁne the cumulative number
of informed and uninformed traders arrival processes (N I and NU) and associated stopping
times as (θIi and θ
U
i ), respectively, as
NUt =
∞∑
i=1
1{θi≤t}∩{Ui}, θ
U
i = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : NUt = i
}
and
N It = Nt −NUt =
∞∑
i=1
1{θi≤t}∩{Ii}, θ
I
i = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : N It = i
}
where Ui (Ii) denotes the event of the time θi trader being of the uninformed (informed)
type.10
Since the informed trader also observes the process D , her information set upon arrival
(time θIi ) is HIi = GI,iθIi , where G
I,i
t = GMt ∨FDt ∨σ
{
θIi ∧ s, s ≤ t
}
, and ∧ denotes the minimal
element.
The noisy traders demand is parametrized indirectly, through their information set. In
particular, we assume that, in addition to observing the market ﬁltration GMt at time t, noisy
traders receive a private signal St. That is, upon arrival at time θ
U
i , the noisy trader receive
the private signal si = SθUi and has therefore the information set HUi = G
U,i
θUi
∨ σ {si}, where
GU,i
θUi
= GMt ∨σ
{
θUi ∧ s, s ≤ t
}
. This indirect modelling of the noisy traders demand simpliﬁes
exposition because: a) since the market maker will, in equilibrium, ﬁlter the information of
each trader’s demand, we are deﬁning the noisy traders demand in the relevant domain
for the ﬁltering problem (rather than having to invert what a particular noisy demand
schedule would imply in terms of ﬁltered information from the market maker point of view);
b) as we will show below, the requirement of noisy and informed traders’ demands being
indistinguishable given the market maker information set, can be very easily formulated
using this indirect modelling of the noise traders’ demand.
In what follows, we postulate that the following assumptions are satisﬁed:
A2. FWT ,FNT and Sθi are conditionally independent given Hi−1for all i, where Hi = Gθi ,
Gt = FVt ∨ FNt .
A3. Ii is independent of FN,S,DT ∨ σ (Uk)k =i.
10Obviously Ui ∪ Ii = Ω.
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A4. P (vi ∈ C|Hi−1, Ii, θi) = P (vi ∈ C|Hi−1, Ui, θi) for C ∈ B (R), where B (R) denotes the
Borel σ-algebra.
Assumption A2 has the following implications. First, that – as typically assumed in
sequential trading models (see O’Hara (1995) for a discussion) – trader’s arrival time is
exogenous and independent from movements in the fundamentals. This, as in Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), rules out a strategic timing of agents arrival but, diﬀerently from them,
does not rule out all other dimensions of strategic behavior since the traders will be free to
chose whether to trade or not and their order size. Note also that the only restriction that
Assumption A2 imposes on the arrival process is that it should be conditionally independent –
that is, it could in principle depend on the past trading history (summarized by Hi). Second,
A2 implies that the signal received by noisy traders does not carry more information about
the fundamental than what could be inferred from the current history of past order sizes
and arrival times.
Remark 1 Note that Hi is the σ-algebra generated by {vj}ij=0 and {θj}ij=0.
Informed traders can potentially beneﬁt from any departures of the stock price from the
fundamental value, and so informed traders could decide to trade as much as possible – but
such a behaviour would quickly reveal the information of the informed to the market maker.
Assumption A3 prevents this from happening by not allowing informed traders to decide
when to arrive to the market. This can be seen as imposing an equilibrium behaviour, as
the one studied in Easley and O’Hara (1987), in which informed agents mimic uninformed
agents behaviour to avoid detection.
Jointly, assumptions A2 and A3 guarantee that the actual population of traders that the
market maker faces is always the same as the potential population of traders, since none of
the traders can endogenously decide when to arrive to the market.
Assumption A4 restricts the signal process received by uninformed traders. It imposes
that the distribution of order size submitted by the investor (conditionally on lagged infor-
mation) is independent of the type of trader, therefore guaranteeing that informed traders
are inconspicuous, in the sense that they cannot be detected by the market maker. This
basically imposes a “pooled” equilibrium, as the one discussed in Easley and O’Hara (1987),
in which informed agents optimally decide to be pooled together with the uninformed ones.
We will show later that this is equivalent to the requirement that the uninformed traders
valuations of the assets do not excessively deviate from the fundamental value of the asset.
Note that the above assumptions on the signal received by the uninformed investor do
not imply that these agents can only act in a purely noisy fashion. For example, it is easy to
show that a setting in which noisy traders receive a noisy estimate of Dt would satisfy the
above assumptions.
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We also assume that agents’ preferences, to be presented below, are common knowledge.
2.3 Agents’ Preferences
2.3.1 Traders’ Preferences
The preferences of all agents are common knowledge. Since there is a continuum of potential
traders and the arrival process is exogenous, upon arrival the conditional probability of
experiencing a second arrival is zero. Therefore, an agent that arrives to the market at time
θi faces a basically static problem. Nevertheless, using the standard utility maximisation
approach, a closed form solution for the market equilibrium can be provided only under
the assumption of risk neutrality. As a consequence, as it is customary in the market
microstructure models of information based trading, we will assume that all agents are
risk neutral.
Recall that the ﬁnal payoﬀ of holding v+ shares is simply v+eDT . Assuming that traders
are risk neutral and that the inter-temporal discount factor is equal to the risk-free interest
and both are equal to zero,11 the expected utility from holding v+ shares until time T for an
agent of type k ∈ {I, U} that arrived to the market at time θki is
E
[
v+eDT
∣∣Hki ] =: v+zki (4)
where zki is the expected utility from owning one stock for a type k trader. Moreover, under
the above assumptions, the expected utility from investing in the risk free asset the amount
needed to buy v+ shares at time θki is simply
v+Aθki
(
v+
)
. (5)
The expected utilities in equations (4) and (5) can be viewed as the outcome of two
alternative investment strategies – buying v+ stocks or investing v+Aθki (v
+) in the risk free
asset. Since a similar expression is associated with sell orders, v−, the optimisation problem
of the agent of type k that arrives at time θki can be expressed as
max
v+,v−
v+
[
zki − Aθki
(
v+
)]
+ v−
[
Bθki
(
v−
)− zki ] . (6)
Note that in the above expression the ﬁrst term refers to buying the stock while the second
refers to selling the stock. As we will show later, in equilibrium it will never be optimal for
the agent to choose both v+ and v− diﬀerent from zero, that is the agent will either buy,
11Generalizing our results to allow the inter-temporal discount and the risk-free rate to be non-zero and
diﬀerent form each other is straightforward, we don’t do so in order to simplify the exposition.
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sell, or not trade.
For later usage, let deﬁne zi as the expected value of holding one share of the asset for
the agent that arrives at time θi, that is
zi = 1{Ii}z
I
i + 1{Ui}z
U
i . (7)
2.3.2 The Specialist’s Preferences
We complete the model assuming the presence of a specialist market maker. The market
maker faces a small proportional cost, δ, to execute the orders placed by traders. That is,
if a trader at time t submits the buying order v+ at the posted ask price At (v
+), the mar-
ket maker will receive, upon completion of the transaction, the amount v+At (v
+) (1− δ).
Similarly, for executing a selling order of size v− the specialist would face a cost of12
v−Bt (v−) (1 + δ). Assuming that it is the trader that incurs a transaction cost is with-
out loss of generality: we could have attributed the transaction cost to the traders without
changing the equilibrium dynamics of the model. The presence of a small transaction cost is
necessary to generate interesting dynamics since, in equilibrium, this will generate a bid ask
spread even in proximity of the zero order size, that is limv↓0At (v)− limv↑0Bt (v) > 0. This
implies that the weakly exogenous (and unobservable) process of arrivals of traders, N , and
the endogenous (and observable) counting process of trades, L, will not necessarily coincide.
This also implies that, in a given time interval, the diﬀerence in number of arrivals
and trades will carry relevant information for the market maker. Nevertheless, the market
maker cannot observe Nt nor, generally, to infer it from the observed number of trades.
For example, if the exogenous arrival process is characterised by time varying intensity, an
observed increase in the number of trades can be attributed either to a) a change in the
intensity of the arrival process or to b) the fact that the market maker’s estimate of the
true value is incorrect and more informed traders choose to trade at the posted prices. We
therefore are in need of specifying the market marker’s prior beliefs about the connection
between Nt and Lt. We assume that the market maker believes that Nt = Lt ∀t. This choice
makes the problem tractable and has the advantage that, from the market maker’s point of
view, this belief is unfalsiﬁable under the assumption of unobservable time varying intensity
of the arrival process. Moreover, this has the advantage of focusing the equilibrium market
dynamic on the market maker’s ﬁltering of the agents information instead that around the
ﬁltering of the arrival process.13
12It is straightforward, in our setting, to allow for a diﬀerent (and time varying) transaction costs for ask
and bid orders. However, we focus on the constant symmetric cost case to simplify exposition.
13Note that preventing the market maker from inferring information contained in the time between arrivals
is also the approach taken by Glosten and Milgrom (1985). For a framework in which the market maker
learns from the time between trades, and hence updates quotes continuously, see Back and Baruch (2004).
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The market maker, as the traders, is risk neutral, implying that her utility form owning
one share of the stock until time T is
ZMt = E
[
eDT
∣∣GMt , Nt = Lt] . (8)
As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the specialist sets up bid and ask prices under a
zero utility gain constraint – that is, the market can be thought of as being populated by a
continuum of competitive (in Bertrand’s sense) market makers. This assumption implies two
restrictions of the market maker’s behaviour. First, as in a competitive market, carrying out
a trade at the posted price will not deliver a utility gain to the specialist (in her ﬁltration).
Second, the specialist should not regret, ex post, having executed the trade at the posted
price. That is, if a trader submits an order of size v, the market maker utility should not
decrease after carrying out the order. More precisely, the time t bid and ask prices, as a
function of the order size v, must satisfy the following conditions
At
(
v+
)
(1− δ) =
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−} E
[
eDT |H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi
]∣∣∣
v˜i=v+,τi=t
, (9)
Bt
(
v−
)
(1 + δ) =
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−} E
[
eDT |H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi
]∣∣∣
v˜i=−v−,τi=t
. (10)
Note that in the above summations there is only one non zero value of the index function for
any realisation of history, implying that these expressions are simple certainty equivalence
conditions that bid and ask prices must satisfy.
Remark 2 Since the market maker sets ask and bid as a function of the volume, and the
price of a transaction can only be at either the ask or the bid, we have that once the volume,
Vt, is observed, the transaction price has no residual information content. That is GMt =
FVt ∨ FLt , implying that H˜Mi = σ
{
{v˜}ij=0 , {τj}ij=0
}
.
Additionally, we impose the following regularity conditions on bid and ask functions:
C1. For a ﬁxed v, the processes B (v−) and A (v+) are left continuous with right limits.
C2. For a ﬁxed t, At (v
+) : R+ → R¯+\ {0} is continuous, nondecreasing and limv+→∞At(v+) =
+∞.
C3. For a ﬁxed t, Bt (v
−) : R+ → R¯+ is continuous, non increasing and limv−→∞Bt(v−) = 0.
C4. For a ﬁxed t, At (0) ≥ Bt (0) for all ω ∈ Ω.
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C5. For any ﬁxed t, At (·) continuously diﬀerentiable, and Bt (·) is continuously diﬀerentiable
on the set {v : Bt (v) > 0}
C6. For a ﬁxed t, vAt (v) is strictly convex, and vBt (v) is strictly concave on the set
{v : Bt (v) > 0}
Condition C1 formalises the idea that, as in the real world, the specialist can change the
bid and ask functions at any point in time except at the time at which the trade occurs.
Condition C2 for the ask price implies that: i) the specialist will never dispose of the
assets for free; ii) the price per-share at which the specialist will agree to sell will not
decrease in the order size; iii) the specialist will refuse to trade inﬁnite quantities. The
ﬁrst two implications are meant to match the real world ask price behaviour, while the last
one rules out degenerated cases. Condition C3 for the bid price per-share is the analog of
condition C2 for the ask price.
Condition C4 is a technical one, and is meant to rule out the degenerate case of ask prices
being below the bid price, while Condition C5 simply assume that the bid and ask function
are suﬃciently smooth.
Condition C6 ensures that the traders’ demand functions are uniquely determined by
their valuations (i.e. it ensures strict concavity of the traders’ objective function in equation
(6)). This is equivalent to imposing a single crossing condition for the demand and supply
functions of the asset.
Also, in order to avoid the degenerated case of no trade ever occurring due to a system-
atically too large bid ask spread, we require the transaction cost δ to be suﬃciently small.
In particular, we have the following condition.
A5. δ ∈ (0, q).
The connection, in the above condition, between the maximum size of the transaction
cost, δ, and the share of uninformed agents, q, is intuitive. The market maker will make
proﬁts, on average, only when dealing with uniformed agents. Therefore, if the transaction
cost that the market maker faces is too large, relative to the share of uniformed agents in
the economy, it will not be optimal for her to trade and she will choose an inﬁnite bid ask
spread.
3 Market Equilibrium
3.1 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
In what follows we prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. We deﬁne a market
equilibrium as follows.
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Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium) A market equilibrium is a set of policy functions At (v
+),
Bt (v
−), vi (Aθi (v
+) , Bθi (v
−)) such that:
1. Conditions C1-C6 are satisﬁed;
2. At (v
+) and Bt (v
−) solve the specialist optimisation problem characterised by equations
(9) and (10) for any v, t;
3. vi (Aθi (v
+) , Bθi (v
−)) solves the trader’s problem in equation (6).
To prove existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium, it is ﬁrst useful to establish
two intermediate results. The ﬁrst Lemma states the solution of the trader’s optimisation
problem for any ask and bid prices that satisfy conditions C1-C6.
Lemma 1 (Trader’s optimal demand) Suppose At (v
+), Bt (v
−) satisfy conditions C1-
C6. Consider a trader who arrives on the market at time θi and observes the posted prices
Aθi (v
+) and Bθi (v
−). Then
• if zi > Aθi (0), the optimal order size, v∗, is strictly positive and is the unique solution
of
zi = Aθi (v) + vA
′
θi
(v) (11)
• if zi < Bθi (0), the optimal order size, v∗, is strictly negative and is the unique solution
of
zi = Bθi (−v)− vB′θi (−v) (12)
• if Bθi (0) ≤ zi ≤ Aθi (0), then the optimal order size is v∗ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Follows from the ﬁrst order conditions of the trader’s problem in
equation (6) and the observation that conditions C2 and C3 ensure existence and ﬁniteness
of the global maximum, while condition C6 ensures uniqueness of the maximum. Moreover,
condition C4 rules out diﬀerent cases from the ones considered in the Lemma.
It is important to stress that the trader’s expected utility from owning the stock is
revealed upon submission of the order v∗. This allows us to solve the ﬁltering problem of
the market maker.
The above result allows us to make an important remark on Assumption A4.
Remark 3 (Remark on Assumption A4.) Note that the optimality conditions in Lemma
1 identify a one to one correspondence between the order size, vi, and the agent’s valuation,
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zi. Denote this invertible map by f : vi → zi. Hence, for C ∈ B (R)
P (zi ∈ C|Hi−1, Ii, θi) = P (f (vi) ∈ C|Hi−1, Ii, θi) = P
(
vi ∈ f−1C|Hi−1, Ii, θi
)
,
P (zi ∈ C|Hi−1, Ui, θi) = P (f (vi) ∈ C|Hi−1, Ui, θi) = P
(
vi ∈ f−1C|Hi−1, Ui, θi
)
.
Therefore, assumption A4 is equivalent to P (zi ∈ C|Hi−1, Ui, θi) = P (zi ∈ C|Hi−1, Ii, θi).
The above reformulation makes clear that Assumption A4 is a requirement on the type of
information that the uniformed agents receives. In a nutshell, it requires that the uninformed
traders’ valuations of the asset do not excessively deviate from the fundamental value of the
asset that is observed by the informed agent.
In the next proposition we characterise the optimal ask and bid price function from the
market maker’s standpoint.
Proposition 4 (Optimal ask and bid functions) Suppose assumptions A1-A5 are sat-
isﬁed. Then there exist optimal ask, At (v
+), and bid, Bt (v
−) , prices that satisfy conditions
C1-C5 and the market maker’s optimality conditions (9) and (10). Moreover, the optimal
At (v) and Bt (v) have the following forms:
A∗t (v) =
q
q − δ
(
1 + αv
q−δ
1−q
) ∞∑
i=0
1{i=Lt−+1}Z
M
τi−1 (13)
B∗t (v) =
{
q
q+δ
(
1− βv q+δ1−q
)∑∞
i=0 1{i=Lt−+1}Z
M
τi−1 if βv
q+δ
1−q ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(14)
where α and β are strictly positive arbitrary constants, and ZMt is given in equation (8).
Proof. The proof, being technical, is reported in Appendix A.1. Nevertheless, the steps
of the proof are quite intuitive. First, we show that, in the market maker ﬁltration, the
probability of a trader being of the uninformed type is simply q independently from the
order size. Second, from the order size and Lemma 1, the market maker can recover the
asset valuation of the trader. Third, combining the probability of trader types, and the
valuations corresponding to each order size, together with the market maker’s indiﬀerence
conditions (9) and (10), give rise to an ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE) for the ask price
function, and one for the bid price function. Each of these ODEs admits two solutions, but
only one solution per equation satisﬁes conditions C2 and C3.
The equilibrium bid and ask price function, depicted in Figure 2 for diﬀerent values of
q, have important implication for market liquidity in terms of depth and tightness. These
properties are discussed in detail in section 4.2. One thing to notice in the ﬁgure is that,
overall, as q – the share of noisy agents – increases, the bid-ask curves become steeper (for
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Figure 2: Ask and Bid equilibrium prices for diﬀerent shares (q) of uninformed traders.
large orders), while the bid-ask spread at zero reduces. This is due to the fact that, when q is
high, informed trades happen less often, hence the price process experiences bigger deviations
from the fundamental value. Hence, the market maker’s potential losses from executing a
large order are substantially larger when q is large.
Note that, in a real world market, the arbitrary constants α and β would be uniquely
identiﬁed by the tick size. Note also that ZMt is always positive, and represents the market
maker’s valuation of owning the stock conditional on all the information available before the
last trade and the fact that a trade is occurring at time t. The next remark deﬁnes the
updating mechanism for the market maker’s valuation of the asset z˜Mi = Z
M
τi
.
Remark 5 (Update of Market Maker’s estimation of the asset value) Note that if
Assumptions A1-A5, as well as Conditions C2-C5, are satisﬁed, the same steps used in
proving Proposition 4 can be used to show that ZMt =
∑∞
i=0 1{i=Lt−}z˜
M
i with
z˜Mi = (1− q) z˜i + qz˜Mi−1. (15)
The above equation states that, in updating her valuation, the market maker will assign
a weight q (the probability of the last trader being uninformed) to her previous valuation,
and weight 1−q (the probability of the trader being informed) to the last trader’s valuation.
We can now establish the equilibrium result in the following Theorem
Theorem 6 Suppose Assumptions A1-A5 are satisﬁed. For strictly positive constants α and
β, there is a unique market equilibrium, A∗t (v), B
∗
t (v) , v
∗
i , where A
∗
t (v) and B
∗
t (v) are given,
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respectively, by equations (13) and (14), and
v∗i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[
1−q
α(1−δ)
(
q−δ
q
zi
zMi
− 1
)] 1−q
q−δ
if q
q−δz
M
i < zi,
−
[
1−q
β(1+δ)
(
1− q+δ
q
zi
zMi
)] 1−q
q+δ
if zi <
q
q+δ
zMi ,
0 if q
q+δ
zMi ≤ zi ≤ qq−δzMi
where zMi := Z
M
θi
Proof of Theorem 6. Due to Proposition (4) we know that, for strictly positive con-
stants α and β, equilibrium ask and bid functions are unique and given by equations (13) and
(14). Using these expressions for A∗t (v) and B
∗
t (v) in the optimality conditions in Lemma
(1) and solving for v completes the proof.
Note that the above equilibrium solution for the order size, v∗, when δ = 0, implies that
traders will buy (sell) the asset if and only if their valuation, zi, is larger (smaller) than the
market maker’s valuation, zMi . When instead the δ > 0, the diﬀerence in valuation necessary
for a trade to occur needs to be larger in order to account for the trading cost δ. Therefore,
in the presence of trading costs, there is an interval of inaction in which no trade occurs even
if the valuations of the market maker and the trader diﬀer. This implies that in equilibrium,
with δ > 0, number of arrivals and number of trades will be diﬀerent with strictly positive
probability. Nevertheless, one can show that this probability is strictly less than one. Thus,
the market maker’s (non falsiﬁable) belief, that number of trades and number of arrivals are
the same, is not irrational.
3.2 The high frequency (tick-by-tick) equilibrium price process
Given the above characterisations of equilibrium ask and bid pricing functions and the equi-
librium trading strategies, we can now characterise the equilibrium price process.
Recall form equation (2) that, since the i-th trade has to occur either at the ask or at
the bid price, the price will be
p˜i = Aτi
(
v˜+i
)
1{v˜i>0} +Bτi
(
v˜−i
)
1{v˜i<0}
and given the zero utility gain conditions for the market maker (9) and (10) this is
p˜i = z˜
M
i
[
1{v˜i>0}
(1− δ) +
1{v˜i<0}
(1 + δ)
]
. (16)
Since, by normalisation, trades start at times after time zero, we need to deﬁne the time
zero price – that is the price of the asset before any trade as happened. Since the form of
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the log proﬁt process is common knowledge, we normalise p˜0 to be equal to the expected
value, for any agent, of holding the asset at time zero. That is p˜0 = e
D0+(μ+ 12σ2)T .
From the solutions for the equilibrium ask and bid (13) and (14) we know that
p˜i = z˜
M
i−1
[
q
q − δ
(
1 + αv˜
q−δ
1−q
i
)
1{v˜i>0} +
q
q + δ
(
1− β |v˜i|
q+δ
1−q
)
1{v˜i<0}
]
.
Putting together the last two expressions we have
p˜i = p˜i−1c1,ic2,i−1 (1 + ξi |v˜i|γi) (17)
where
c1,i =
{
q
q−δ if the i-th trade occurs at ask
q
q+δ
if the i-th trade occurs at bid
c2,i =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1− δ if the i-th trade occurs at ask and i > 0
1 + δ if the i-th trade occurs at bid and i > 0
1 if i = 0
γi =
{
q−δ
1−q if the i-th trade occurs at ask
q+δ
1−q if the i-th trade occurs at bid
ξi =
{
α if the i-th trade occurs at ask
−β if the i-th trade occurs at bid
(18)
The above implies that at very high frequency the log price process should be autocor-
related. Moreover, using the relation between order size and cumulated trading volume (1)
we have
log
Pt+s
Pt
=
Lt+s∑
i=Lt
{
log
(
1 + ξi
∣∣Vτi − Vτi−1∣∣γi)+ log c1,i + log c2,i−1} . (19)
That is, there is a direct relationship between price changes and changes in the volume of
trade. In particular, the above equation implies that, at high frequency, the volatility of
log returns is i) stochastic, and ii) a function of trade volume
∣∣Vτi − Vτi−1∣∣. Moreover, the
relationship in equation (19), discussed in detail in Section 4.2, is consistent with a large
body of empirical evidence on the joint behaviour of volume, prices, and volatility.14
The characterisations of the high frequency price process provided in equations (17) and
(19) are a function of endogenous variables – respectively of order size, and volume and
number of trades. In the next Lemma we characterise the price process as a function of the
exogenous fundamental value of the asset.
14See e.g. Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992), Farmer and Lillo (2004), Farmer, Lillo, and Mantegna
(2003), Potters and Bouchaud (2003).
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Lemma 2 (price process and trading times as a function of fundamentals) Suppose
that Assumptions A1-A5 are satisﬁed and that the market is at the equilibrium. We can de-
ﬁne the price process and the time of trades as a function of the exogenous process Z as
follows.
First, normalise τ0 and p˜0 as follows
τ0 = 0, P0 = p˜0 = e
D0+(μ+ 12σ2)T , c2,0= 1.
Second, deﬁne recursively the trading times
τi = inf {θj > τi−1 : log zj − log p˜i−1 /∈ (b (c2,i−1) , a (c2,i−1))} , (20)
where
a (x) = log
(
qx
q − δ
)
, b (x) = log
(
qx
q + δ
)
, (21)
and prices are given by
p˜i =
1
c2,i
[(1− q) zi + qp˜i−1c2,i−1] , (22)
where c2,i in equation (18) can be redeﬁned as
c2,i =
{
1− δ if log z˜i − log p˜i−1 > a (c2,i−1) and i > 0
1 + δ if log z˜i − log p˜i−1 < b (c2,i−1) and i > 0
(23)
Proof of Lemma 2. Setting τ0 = 0 is an innocuous normalisation of the time scale.
The deﬁnition of the equilibrium τi in equation (20), as well as c2,i in equation (23), follow
from: the agent’s optimality conditions in Lemma 1; the form of the equilibrium bid and ask
function in Proposition 4; and equation (16), that allows us to replace the market maker’s
valuation, z˜Mi , with the price, p˜i. The deﬁnition of the equilibrium price process, p˜i, in
equation (22) follows from the market maker’s valuation update in Remark 5 and equation
(16).
In a nutshell, the above Lemma follows from the observation that, in equilibrium, the
trade will occur at the ask price if and only if the valuation of the agent is suﬃciently
higher than the last recorded market price (log zj− log p˜i−1 > a (c2,i−1)), and at the bid price
if instead the agent’s valuation is suﬃciently lower than the last recorded price (log zj −
log p˜i−1 < b (c2,i−1)). This inter-temporal link with the lagged price is due to the fact that
the current price is just a linear function of the current market maker’s valuation, and this
valuation is updated recursively (see Remark 5) due to the presence of uninformed agents.
Note that if there were no trading costs we would have a (.) = b (.) = 0, implying that agents
would always decide to trade either at the ask or bid price.
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Since in the above Lemma we have deﬁned the equilibrium trading times and prices as
a function on the log valuation (log z), we now turn to the identiﬁcation of the distribution
of this quantity. This is a necessary step to be able to characterise the equilibrium volatility
process. In particular, we will look at the distribution of log zi conditional on the information
set Hi−1 ∨ σ {θi} – the information set that contains all the past history of prices, volume of
trades, arrivals, and the time of the next arrival. For this task it is convenient to deﬁne Dtrt
as the value of the log proﬁt that could be inferred observing the valuation of the last agent
that arrived on the market. That is
dtri =
{
log zi −
(
μ+ σ
2
2
)
(T − θi) ∀i ≥ 1
D0 i = 0
, Dtrt =
∞∑
i=0
1{i=Nt}d
tr
i . (24)
Note that the value of Dtrτi can be always inferred from the last occurred trade due to the
fact that agents preferences are common knowledge. The distribution of dtri is characterised
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumptions A1-A5 are satisﬁed. Then
P
[
dtri ≤ x|Hi−1, θi
]
= P [Dθi ≤ x|Hi−1, θi]
= (1− q)
i−1∑
j=1
qi−1−jP
[
dtrj + εi,j ≤ x|dtrj ,Δi,j
]
+ qi−1P
[
dtr0 + εi,0 ≤ x|dtr0 ,Δi,0
]
where Δi,j := θi− θj, εi,j := μΔi,j +σ
√
Δi,jηi,j, and ηi,j ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of dtrj and
Δi,j for all j < i.
The proof of the above Lemma is quite involved, and we therefore report it in Appendix
A.1. The rationale behind it is nevertheless quite intuitive. At each point in time either
an informed (with probability 1 − q) or an uniformed (with probability q) agent arrives to
the market and, from equation (24), her dtri is simply a (log) linear function of her expected
payoﬀ (zi) from holding the asset. Recall that Hi−1 contains all the past history of arrivals
and volume of trade, and based on this information and the knowledge of the time of the last
arrival (θi) only, informed and uninformed agents are indistinguishable. This implies that
P [dtri ≤ x|Hi−1, θi, Ii] = P [dtri ≤ x|Hi−1, θi, Ui]. Moreover, only the arrival of an informed
agent can add new relevant information about the fundamental. Therefore, the last relevant
information is revealed by the last informed arrival, and the probability of this being the j-th
arrival is simply (1− q) qi−1−j. Moreover, if no informed agent ever arrived to the market
before the i-th arrival, the only relevant information is the common knowledge dtr0 , and this
event might occur with probability qi−1. Furthermore, since the innovations in D are simple
independent Brownian motion diﬀerences, the ε terms appear.
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Note that since prices are uniquely determined by Dtr (through Lemma (2) and equation
(24)), Lemma 3 also characterises the distribution of prices. Therefore, if the Dtr process
were to converge in distribution, this would also imply (by continuos mapping theorem), the
convergence in distribution of the price process. This limiting distribution is the focus of the
next sub section.
3.3 The medium frequency equilibrium price process
Having characterised the price process and the distribution of agents’ valuations on the tick-
by-tick time scale, we now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium price process at lower
frequencies. This is needed in order to establish the link between information based trading
and, as an equilibrium outcome, endogenous stochastic volatility.
In this section we make one simplifying assumption regarding the arrival process: we
consider a Poisson process. The assumption of a Poisson arrival process is not strictly
necessary, since all that we need to derive our results is that the arrival process satisﬁes a
set of properties (described in detail below) that hold almost surely for a Poisson process.
In order to simplify exposition, we consider a process with constant intensity but we could
as well handle a process with time varying intensity. Considering a ﬁxed intensity arrival
process has also the advantage that the only channel through which stochastic volatility
will arise is the information based trading. Moreover, assuming constant intensity is a very
minor restriction since, as we will show, the equilibrium medium and low frequency price
and volatility processes, as well as the number of trades process, will be independent of the
arrival process.
By medium frequency we mean a time interval in which the number of arrivals is vey
large. To model this mathematically, we send the intensity of arrivals to inﬁnity. This
modelling approach has the advantage that, as the intensity of arrivals goes to inﬁnity, the
constraint to trade due to the exogenous arrival times will disappear.
The key result established in this section is summarised in the following Theorem.
Theorem 7 (Limiting Price Process) Suppose the process D is given by
dDt = μdt+ σdW
d
t , D0 = const
with W d being a standard Brownian motion with respect to (Fs)s≥0. Suppose also that Λ
is a Poisson process, with intensity parameter λ, deﬁned on [0,+∞), and FΛ∞ is inde-
pendent of FW∞ . Then there exists a sequence of Poisson arrival processes Nn, satisfying
P [Nnt = Λtn, t ∈ [0, T ]] = 1, such that the equilibrium price process P n resulting from any
sequence of markets Mn (Nn, D , Sn, Un) satisfying Assumptions A2-A6, weakly converges
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in Skorokhod topology. The limit price process P is a functional of W , a standard Brownian
Motion, independent of the number of arrivals process, Λ. Moreover, this functional has the
form
Pt
d
=
Lpt∏
i=1
φi
(
q
φi−1
+ 1− q
)
(25)
where φ0 = 1, τ0 = 0 and, for any i ≥ 1
φi :=
⎧⎨
⎩
q
q−δ if σ
(
Wτi −Wτi−1
)− σ2
2
(τi − τi−1) = a
(
q
φi−1
+ 1− q
)
q
q+δ
if σ
(
Wτi −Wτi−1
)− σ2
2
(τi − τi−1) = b
(
q
φi−1
+ 1− q
) .
τi = inf
{
t ≥ τi−1 : σ
(
Wt −Wτi−1
)− σ2
2
(t− τi−1) /∈
[
b
(
q
φi−1
+ 1− q
)
, a
(
q
φi−1
+ 1− q
)]}
Lpt =
∞∑
j=1
1{τj≤t}
and a (.) and b(.) are deﬁned in equation (21).
The rest of this section is dedicated to prove the above theorem. But before undertaking
this task, we can use the above result to characterise the ﬁrst two moments of the price
process in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Volatility of the Limiting Price Process) The distribution of φi is, for
i > 1
φi :=
⎧⎨
⎩
q/ (q − δ) w.p. 1{φi−1= qq−δ}
(q−δ)(1+q)
2q(1−δ) + 1{φi−1= qq+δ}
(q−δ)(1−q)
2q(1+δ)
q/ (q + δ) w.p. 1{φi−1= qq−δ}
(q+δ)(1−q)
2q(1−δ) + 1{φi−1= qq+δ}
(q+δ)(1+q)
2q(1+δ)
.
and for i = 1
φ1 :=
{
q/ (q − δ) w.p. q−δ
2q
q/ (q + δ) w.p. q+δ
2q
.
Implying the conditional moments for i > 1
E
[
p˜i
p˜i−1
|FWτi−1
]
= 1, V ar
(
p˜i
p˜i−1
|FWτi−1
)
=
δ2(1− q2)
q2 − δ2 .
Proof. The proof is reported in Appendix A.1.
Remark 8 (Ergodic Distribution) The two state Markov process for φi deﬁned above
has the following ergodic distribution:
φi :=
{
q/ (q − δ) w.p. (q−δ)(1−δ)
2(q+δ2)
q/ (q + δ) w.p. (q+δ)(1+δ)
2(q+δ2)
.
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The above corollary makes clear that, on the trade time scale, the price process, is char-
acterised by constant volatility. Since trade and calendar time diﬀer (due to the inaction
region generated by the bid ask spread), this implies that the volatility on the calendar time
scale will be driven by the number of trades process and, since this process is stochastic, the
calendar time volatility itself is stochastic. The properties of the trade by trade volatility
characterised above are discussed in detail in section 4.2.
To prove Theorem 7 we ﬁrst construct a new process (Y ) that has exactly the same
distribution as the shadow valuation of the asset (Dtr) in Lemma 3. Then, we establish
weak convergence of this process in Skorokhod topology. And ﬁnally, to complete the proof
via the Continuous Mapping Theorem, we establish the continuity of the mapping between
the shadow valuation process and trade prices.
In order to deﬁne a sequence of markets as in the above Theorem, we need to deﬁne the
processes Nn, Sn, and Un. Given these processes, the price process P n is obtained from
Theorem 6 and Equation 17.
First, we deﬁne the process of traders’ arrival Nn. Consider any given Poisson process
Λ, with intensity λ, and corresponding arrival times γi := inf {t ≥ 0 : Λt ≥ i} that are inde-
pendent of FW∞ . The arrival intensity of the n-th market is constructed as nλ. For any of
these Λ processes, we introduce regularity conditions by considering the following sets:
Ω1 =
{
ω ∈ Ω : lim
i→+∞
∑xi
j=1 (γj − γj−1)2∑i
j=1 (γj − γj−1)2
= x for any x ∈ [0, 1]
}
,
Ω2 =
{
ω ∈ Ω : max
i≤k
(γi − γi−1) < ∞ for all k ∈ N+
}
,
Ω3 = ∪∞k=1 ∩∞i=k {ω ∈ Ω : (γi − γi−1) ≤ 2 log (i)} ,
Ω4 =
{
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞
Λtn
n
= tλ for any t ∈ [0, T ]
}
,
Ω5 =
{
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞
∑Λtn
i=1 (γ¯i − γ¯i−1)
Λtn
= λ−1 for any t ∈ [0, T ]
}
,
where the operator · returns the largest integer smaller than its argument. Note that the
above regularity conditions are satisﬁed by the Poisson process almost surely since: a) from
the strong Law of Large Numbers P (Ωi) = 1 for i = 1, 4; b) P (Ω3) = 1 from the Borel-
Cantelli Lemma; c) P (Ω2) = 1 is a property of the Poisson process; d) condition Ω5 is simply
a strong law of large number requirement; e) P (Ω5) = 1 for a Poisson process. Nevertheless,
the fact that these regularity conditions are satisﬁed almost surely does not guarantee that
they will be satisﬁed for every ω ∈ Ω, since on some zero probability sets they could be
violated. Therefore, since we will be conditioning on paths of Λ, we need to modify the Λ
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process on the zero probability sets to ensure that these properties will hold for every ω ∈ Ω.
The modiﬁcation of the Poisson process Λ, denoted Λ¯, that satisﬁes the above regularity
conditions for each ω ∈ Ω, is given by15
γ¯0 (ω) = 0, γ¯i (ω) =
{
γi (ω) if ω ∈ ∩4j=1Ωj
γ¯i−1 (ω) + 1λ if ω ∈ Ω\
(∩4j=1Ωj) , Λ¯t =
∞∑
i=1
1{γ¯i≤t}.
The corresponding sequence of traders arrival processes can now be deﬁned as
Nnt = Λ¯tn, (26)
θni =
γ¯i
n
. (27)
Note that the intensity of the counting process Nn is simply λn. So, as n → ∞, the
intensity of arrivals goes to inﬁnity. Moreover, note that the arrival process just deﬁned
satisﬁes Assumption A1.
Second, the above Theorem requires us to consider a sequence of markets. Nevertheless,
we have established that, in equilibrium, market prices are uniquely determined by Dtr
through Lemma (2) and equation (24), and we have already characterised in Lemma 3 the
distribution of Dtr. As a consequence, since we are aiming to prove only weak convergence
of the price process, it is enough to construct a sequence of processes, Y n, that have the
same distribution as the Dtr process that results from the market equilibrium.
In the following Lemma we construct the Y n process such that L (Dtr,n|F Λ¯∞) = L (Y n|F Λ¯∞) ,
where L (·|F Λ¯∞) denotes the ﬁnite dimensional distribution and Dtr,n denotes the Dtr process
in the market Mn. Therefore, for any ﬁxed n, Y nt has the same information content as the
value of the log proﬁt that could be inferred observing the valuation of the last agent that
arrived (before time t) on the market Mn. That is, the process Y n can be thought of as a
value process of the log proﬁt at arrival times.
Lemma 4 Fix a process Nn given by Equation (26), and any market Mn (Nn, D , Sn, Un)
satisfying Assumptions A1-A6. Let Dtr,n be the resulting value of the log proﬁt from the
agents’ point of view, given in equation (24), and that uniquely determines the equilibrium
price process (through Lemma (2) and equation (24)).
Consider the process Y n, on the interval [0, T ], given by
Y nt =
∞∑
j=0
1{Nnt =j}y
n
j , (28)
yn0 = D0, (29)
15Note that Λ¯ is an adapted process since the ﬁltration we use satisﬁes the usual conditions.
26
yni =
i−1∑
j=0
ζi−1,j
(
ynj + ε
n
i,j
)
, (30)
where εni,j := μΔ
n
i,j + σ
√
Δni,jηi,j, Δ
n
i,j := θ
n
i − θnj , ηi,j is an independent standard Gaussian,
and ζi−1,j is a 0 or 1 random variable such that:
∑i−1
j=0 ζi−1,j = 1;
P (ζi−1,j = 1) =
{
(1− q) qi−1−j for j > 0
qi−1 for j = 0
; (31)
and σ {ζi−1,j}i−1j=0 ⊥ ∨i′ =iσ {ζi′−1,j}i
′
j=0; ∨iσ {ζi−1,j}i−1j=0 ⊥ F Λ¯∞. Then we have
L
(
Y n|F Λ¯∞
)
= L (Y n|FNnT ) = L (Dtr,n|FNnT ) = L(Dtr,n|F Λ¯∞) (32)
L
(
PY n|F Λ¯∞
)
= L (PY n|FNnT ) = L (P n|FNnT ) = L(P n|F Λ¯∞) (33)
where P is the mapping from the value process of log proﬁts at arrival times to equilibrium
prices (deﬁned in Lemma 2 and equation (24)), and P n is the equilibrium price process of
the Mn market.
Proof. Equation (32) follows from direct comparison of the distribution of Y n and the
one of Dtr in Lemma 3 and the fact that Y n and Dtr are deﬁned on [0, T ]. Equation (33)
follows from the fact that equations (2) and (24) identify a unique mapping between Dtr
and the equilibrium price process, and the fact that prices are deﬁned on [0, T ] .
The above Lemma makes clear that, to establish and characterise the convergence of the
Equilibrium price process, it is enough to establish and characterise the convergence of the
Law of Y n and the continuity of the mapping P .
For convenience and clarity of exposition (and to avoid some technical issues arising
from zero probability sets) we deﬁne a new (random) probability measure P¯ to remove the
conditioning in equations (32) and (33). That is, let P¯ be a measure on F Λ¯∞ ∨n FY nT , given
by the regular version of the kernel P
(
G|F Λ¯∞
)
, i.e. for any G ⊂ F Λ¯∞ ∨n FY nT we have that
P¯ (G) = P
(
G|F Λ¯∞
)
. Such a P¯ measure exist and is unique due to Theorem 6.4 of Kallenberg
(2002). Therefore, convergence under P¯ (i.e. L¯ (Y n) → L¯ (Y )) implies convergence under
the original P measure (i.e. L (Y n) → L (Y )).
Using the deﬁnition of Y n (in Lemma 4) and P¯, we can establish the ﬁrst convergence
result needed to prove Theorem 7.
Proposition 9 Consider Y¯ nt :=
∑∞
i=0 1{Nnt =i} [y
n
i + μ (T − θni )]. Then the sequence of pro-
cesses
(
Y¯ n, eY¯
n
, θ¯n, F¯n), where F¯nt := F Λ¯∞ ∨ F Y¯ nt and θ¯nt := θnNnt , weakly converges in Sko-
rokhod topology on D ([0, T ]) (the space of ca´dla´g processes in the [0, T ] interval), as n → ∞,
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to
(
Y¯ , eY¯ , θ¯, F¯), where F¯t := F Λ¯∞ ∨ F Y¯t , θ¯t = t, and Y¯t = σWt where W is a standard
Brownian motion on its own augmented ﬁltration and it is independent of F Λ¯∞.
The proof of the above proposition is quite technical, and requires establishing some
intermediate results, and is therefore reported in Appendix A.2. Nevertheless, its core is
quite simple to grasp. The Y¯ n process is, by construction, a long memory process. Therefore,
to establish the above limiting results, we show that its serial correlation decays at a fast
enough rate to ensure mixingale convergence. With this result at hand, we then prove that
Y¯ is proportional to a standard Brownian motion by showing that it is a local martingale
with quadratic variation equal to σ2t.
Since, by deﬁnition, Y nt ≡ Y¯ nt + μ
(
θ¯nt − T
)
, and the above Proposition states the joint
convergence of Y¯ n and θ¯n, we have that a similar convergence result holds for Y n.
Corollary 2 The sequence of processes
(
Y n, eY
n
, θ¯n, F¯n), weakly converges in Skorokhod
topology on D ([0, T ]), as n → ∞, to (Y, eY , θ¯, F¯), and Yt = μ (t− T ) + σWt where W is a
standard Brownian motion on its own augmented ﬁltration and it is independent of F Λ¯∞
Given the above convergence result for Y n, and since (from Lemma 4) L (PY n|F Λ¯∞) =
L (P n|F Λ¯∞), all we need to complete the proof of Theorem 7 is to establish that the sequence
of processes PY n converges – that is, we need to establish the convergence of the sequence
of equilibrium price processes (P n). We do so by i) breaking the map P into two maps, P1
and P2, and establishing ii) the convergence of the processes P1Y n and iii) the continuity
of the map P2.
First, the map P1 : D( [0, T ]) → D( [0, T ]) is given by
(P1f) (t) := f(t) +
(
μ+
σ2
2
)
(T − sup {s ≤ t : f(s−) 	= f(t)}) , ∀f ∈ D [0, T ] .
Note that P1 identiﬁes the arrival times. In particular, the sup component returns the
previous period arrival time, when f is a path of (the piecewise constant) process Y n, and
it is equal to t if f is a path of the (limiting) continuous process Y . Thus we have
(P1Y n)t = Y nt +
(
μ+
σ2
2
)(
T − θ¯nt
)
=: Hnt . (34)
where H is the valuation of the agent that last arrived on the market (note that P1Y nt is
just the log of the expectation of eY
n
T ).
It follows from Corollary 2 (and Corollary VI.3.33.b of Jacod and Shiryaev (2003)) that(
Hn, θ¯n, F¯n), weakly converges in Skorokhod topology on D ([0, T ]), as n → ∞, to (H, θ¯, F¯),
and
Ht =
σ2
2
(T − t) + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ] (35)
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where W is a standard Brownian motion on its own augmented ﬁltration.
Second, note that the price process can be recovered as P n ≡ P2P1Y n, where P2 :
D( [0, T ]) → D( [0, T ]) is deﬁned by (P2f) (t) := g(τ f
Lft
) for any f ∈ D [0, T ], where Lft :=∑
i≥0 1{τfi ≤t}, and g (·) and τ
f are obtained through the following recursion
τ f0 = 0, g0 = e
f(0), cf2,0 = 1,
τ fi = inf
{
t > τ fi−1 : f (t)− ln g
(
τ fi−1
)
/∈
(
b
(
cf2,i−1
)
, a
(
cf2,i−1
))}
, (36)
where a(.) and b(.) are deﬁned in Equation (21),
cf2,i =
⎧⎨
⎩
1− δ if f
(
τ fi
)
− ln g
(
τ fi−1
)
> a
(
cf2,i−1
)
and i > 0
1 + δ if f
(
τ fi
)
− ln g
(
τ fi−1
)
< b
(
cf2,i−1
)
and i > 0
(37)
and
g
(
τ fi
)
=
1
cf2,i
[
(1− q) ef(τfi ) + qg
(
τ fi−1
)
cf2,i−1
]
. (38)
Note that the above recursion is analogous to the one deﬁning the price process and trading
times as a function of fundamentals in Lemma 2 where, in particular, the equation for
stopping times τ fi corresponds to the times of trades in equation (20), and the equation for
the update of the function g(·) is nothing but the price evolution deﬁned in equation (22).
Consider the following set of functions C
C :=
{
f ∈ C [0, T ] : LfT < ∞, τ fi = τ f+i , LfT− = LfT , ∀i = 1, . . . , LfT , Kτ > 0, τ f1 	= 0
}
(39)
where
τ f+i := inf
{
t ≥ τ fi−1 : f (t)− ln g
(
τ fi−1
)
/∈
[
b
(
cf2,i−1
)
, a
(
cf2,i−1
)]}
Kτ := min
{
min
i=1,...,LfT
(
τ fi − τ fi−1
)
;T − τ f
LfT
}
that is, the set of continuous functions characterised by spaced apart hitting times, and that
cross the boundaries, deﬁned by a(·) and b(·), upon reaching them. Note that when f belong
to the set C, we have that (P2f) (t) = exp
{
f
(
τ f
Lft
)}
where Lft :=
∑
i≥0 1{τfi ≤t}, and τ
f , are
obtained through the following recursion
τ f0 = 0, c
f
2,0 = 1,
τ f+i = τ
f
i = inf
{
t > τ fi−1 : f (t)− f
(
τ fi−1
)
/∈
(
b
(
cf2,i−1
)
, a
(
cf2,i−1
))}
, (40)
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where
cf2,i =
⎧⎨
⎩
1− δ if f
(
τ fi
)
− f
(
τ fi−1
)
= a
(
cf2,i−1
)
and i > 0,
1 + δ if f
(
τ fi
)
− f
(
τ fi−1
)
= b
(
cf2,i−1
)
and i > 0.
(41)
Note that a path of Brownian motion (with or without a constant drift) belongs to the set
C almost surely (since
∣∣∣b(cf2,i−1)∣∣∣ , a(cf2,i−1) > 0 for all i, i.e. since, at any given hitting
time, the distance between the current value of the function and the next hitting bound is
strictly positive).
To establish the convergence in distribution of the equilibrium price processes (P n), we
need to establish the continuity of the map P2 (on the set C), which is done in Lemma 5
below (the proof of the Lemma is reported in Appendix A.1).
Lemma 5 For any function f belonging to the set C deﬁned in equation (39), the map P2
deﬁned by equations (36)-(38) is continuous in Skorokhod topology at f .
With the above result at hand, we can complete the proof of Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7. Observe that
lim
n→∞
L
(
P n|F Λ¯∞
)
= lim
n→∞
L
(
PY n|F Λ¯∞
)
= lim
n→∞
L
(
P2Hn|F Λ¯∞
)
= L
(
P2H|F Λ¯∞
)
where the ﬁrst equality is due to equation (33), the second equality is due to the deﬁnition
of the map P2, and the last equality is due to the convergence of Hn established in Corollary
2 and the continuity of the map P2 proved in Lemma 5.
The conclusion of the Theorem follows once we observe that H ∈ C. Therefore the
limiting price process, P , exists and is given by
Pt
d
:= (P2H) (t) = exp
{
HτH
LHt
}
=
LHt∏
i=1
cH2,i−1φi, (42)
where
φi :=
{
q/ (q − δ) if HτHi −HτHi−1 = a
(
cH2,i−1
)
and i > 0
q/ (q + δ) if HτHi −HτHi−1 = b
(
cH2,i−1
)
and i > 0
.
The statement of the theorem follows upon observing the form of H in equation (35), and
that: cH2,i ≡ q/φi + 1− q, τH ≡ τ , Lp ≡ LH .
Note that the medium frequency price process in equation (42) clearly does not depend
on the volume of trade, nor on the traders’ arrival process, but only on the number of trades,
LHt . Moreover, the above shows that the volatility of the price process is aﬀected by the
parameters q and δ.
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3.4 The low, and ultra-low, frequency equilibrium price processes
In order to characterise the low frequency price process behaviour, we will send the number
of trades between time s and t, that is Lpt −Lps, to inﬁnity, and we will study the volatility of
the limiting distribution of the (appropriately scaled) log return. This task is complicated by
the fact that a) the sequence of φ’s, that drives the price process, is serially dependent (from
Corollary 1), and b) the time between arrivals is also dependent (from Theorem 7, since this
quantity too depends upon the sequence of φ’s). Note also that, although we have already
obtained the limiting trade by trade volatility in Corollary 3.3, on the calendar time scale
the volatility of the price process is also aﬀected by the average time between consecutive
trades, thus altering the limiting distribution on this time scale.
In what follows, we establish that the (centred) calendar time of trades is a mixingale
and that the sample mean of times between consecutive trades (i.e. the inter-arrival time of
trades) converges almost surely to a constant. Based on this result, we construct a (novel)
central limit type argument to characterise the limiting volatility of the price process on the
calendar time scale.
Lemma 6 (Expected Inter-arrival Time of Trades) Let τn denote the stopping time
deﬁned in Theorem 7. Then
τn
n
−→
n→∞
μτ :=
2
σ2
[
log
q − δ
q(1− δ) +
(q + δ)(1 + δ)
2 (q + δ2)
log
(1− δ)(q + δ)
(1 + δ)(q − δ)
]
a.s.. (43)
Moreover, for any ω ∈ Ω such that limn→∞ τn(ω)n = μτ , we have
Lpt
t
(ω) −→
t→∞
1
μτ
. (44)
The proof of the above Lemma is technical and we therefore conﬁne it to Appendix
A.1. Nevertheless, its mechanic is simple since it is based on establishing that the serial
dependence of inter-arrival times decays exponentially, therefore the sequence of (centred)
inter-arrival times is a (L2) mixingale. This result allows us to characterise the low frequency
distribution of log returns in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 (Low, and Ultra-low, Frequency Return Distributions) Let μτ be
as deﬁned in Lemma 6. The asymptotic distributions of log returns are:
log Pt
Ps
− σ2
2
(s− t)√
Lpt − Lps
d−→
t−s→∞
N (0, σ2μτ) , (45)
log Pt
Ps
− σ2
2
(s− t)√
t− s
d−→
t−s→∞
N (0, σ2) . (46)
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Proof. Deﬁne τ ′k := inf {n ∈ N : n ≥ τk}. Fix an s ≥ 0 and an ω ∈ C where C :={
ω ∈ Ω : limn→∞, τn(ω)n = μτ
}
, and observe that
τ ′
Lpt
t
(ω) ≡
(
τ ′
Lpt
− τLpt
Lpt
(ω) +
τLpt
Lpt
(ω)
)
Lpt
t
(ω).
By Lemma 6, for any ω ∈ C, we have that limt→∞ L
p
t
t
(ω) = 1
μτ
, implying that
0 ≤ lim
t→∞
τ ′
Lpt
− τLpt
Lpt
(ω) ≤ lim
t→∞
1
Lpt
(ω) = 0.
Hence (
τ ′
Lpt
− τLpt
Lpt
Lpt
t
)
(ω) −→
t→∞
0.
Similarly, from Lemma 6 and the deﬁnition of C, we have that for ω ∈ C
(
τLpt
Lpt
Lpt
t
)
(ω) −→
t→∞
1.
Moreover, since P (C) = 1 by Lemma 6, we have
τ ′
L
p
t
t
−→
t→∞
1 a.s., which implies
τ ′
L
p
t
−τ ′
Lst
t−s −→t−s→∞ 1
a.s.. Thus, it follows from the Anscombe’s Theorem (see e.g. Gut (2009), Theorem 1.3.1)
that
Wτ ′
L
p
t
−Wτ ′
L
p
s√
t− s ≡
∑τ ′Lpt −τ ′Lps−1
i=0
(
Wi+1+τ ′
L
p
s
−Wi+τ ′
L
p
s
)
√
t− s
d−→
t−s→∞
N (0, 1) .
Note that
− W
∗
√
t− s
d∼ inf
u∈
[
τ
L
p
t
,τ
L
p
t
+1
]
Wu −Wτ
L
p
t√
t− s ≤
Wτ ′
L
p
t
−Wτ
L
p
t√
t− s ≤ sup
u∈
[
τ
L
p
t
,τ
L
p
t
+1
]
Wu −Wτ
L
p
t√
t− s
d∼ W
∗
√
t− s,
where the equivalence in distribution follows from the strong Markov property of brownian
motion and W ∗ := supu∈[0,1]Wu. Since P (W
∗ < ∞) = 1 we have that
Wτ ′
L
p
t
−Wτ
L
p
t√
t−s −→t−s→∞ 0
a.s.. Similarly,
Wτ ′
L
p
s
−Wτ
L
p
s√
t−s −→t−s→∞ 0 a.s.. Hence, from Slutsky’s theorem (see e.g. Hayashi
(2000), Lemma 2.4), it follows that
Wτ
L
p
t
−Wτ
L
p
s√
t− s
d−→
t−s→∞
N (0, 1) ,
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and a further application of Slutsky’s theorem delivers
Wτ
L
p
t
−Wτ
L
p
s√
Lpt − Lps
≡
Wτ
L
p
t
−Wτ
L
p
s√
t− s
√
t− s√
Lpt − Lps
d−→
t−s→∞
N (0, μτ ) .
Since, from the proof of Theorem 7 we know that logPt has the same law as Hτ
L
p
t
(see
equation (42)) deﬁned in equation (35), the conclusion of the proposition follows.
Equation (45) implies that, at low frequency, the log return process on the calendar
time scale is characterised by stochastic volatility, and that the driver of time variation in
volatility is the number of trades that occur between time t and s. Moreover, the fact that
log returns are Gaussian, after a stochastic time change with respect to number of trades,
is exactly the empirical ﬁnding of Ane´ and Geman (2000). Last but not least, this result
implies that periods of high trading activity will tend to coincide with periods of increased
return volatility and is consistent with the Wall St. wisdom that “it takes volume to move
the price” (since, at low frequency, volume of trade is simply proportional to the number of
trades).
The ultra-low frequency result in equation (46) arises due to the fact that, at this fre-
quency, the number of trades per time interval converges, hence the stochastic volatility
driven by the number of trades disappears (hence at this frequency fundamental and price
volatility coincide as e.g. in Bernhardt and Taub (2008)). This ﬁnding is consistent with the
fact that volatility clustering is, in the data, very evident at high and medium frequency,
but typically harder to detect at extremely low frequency.
4 The Equilibrium Determinants of Liquidity and
Volatility
Based on the results of the previous section, we can now analyse how the degree of asymmetric
information and market frictions aﬀect the equilibrium market liquidity and volatility, and
how these quantities would be aﬀected by the introduction of a Tobin Tax.
4.1 Equilibrium liquidity
Kyle (1985) deﬁnes a liquid market as one in which: a) the costs of trading small amounts are
themselves small (bid-ask spreads are small) i.e. the market is tight ; b) the costs of trading
large amounts are small (big trades don’t cause large price movements) i.e. the market is
deep; c) discrepancies between prices and true values of assets are small and are corrected
quickly i.e. the market is resilient.
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Figure 3: Market tightness. Bid-ask spread as a percentage of the market maker’s estimate of the fun-
damental value as the order size approaches zero, i.e. 2qδq2−δ2 , as a function of δ (Panel A) and q (Panel
B).
In our model, tightness, depth, and resilience are all determined in equilibrium, and they
are all functions (that can be expressed in closed form) of adverse selection in the market
(pinned down by the parameter 1− q) and the magnitude of market frictions (embodied by
the parameter δ). Moreover, an increase in the parameter δ can be interpreted as analogous
to the introduction of a proportional ﬁnancial transaction tax – aka Tobin Tax – of the type
implemented in several countries and currently being under discussion within the European
Union.
The tightness of the market can be obtained from the ask and bid price schedules in
equations (13) and (14) of Proposition 4 as the order size approaches zero. The resulting
percentage bid-ask spread (as a percentage of the market maker’s estimate of the fundamental
value) is equal to 2qδ
q2−δ2 and is depicted in Figure 3. Note that, in our setting, the bid-ask
spread is a function of only the degree of adverse selection (1− q) and the order processing
cost (δ). This is consistent with the empirical literature that ﬁnds that about 86-100% of the
spread is generated by these two forces (see e.g. Stoll (1989), George, Kaul, and Nimalendran
(1991), and Huang and Stoll (1996)), with the remaining fraction (if any) being driven by
inventory costs. Panel A of Figure 3 shows that, as the degree of market friction δ increases,
the bid-ask spread becomes wider, hence market tightness is decreasing in δ. This is simply
due to the fact that increasing δ the trading cost incurred by the market maker becomes
larger, hence, in order to compensate for this, the mark-up on the market maker valuation
needed to break even in a trade increases. More interestingly, the rate at which market
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Figure 4: Inverse market depth i.e. Kyle’s λ. Panels A and B depict the slope of the ask price schedule,
normalised by the market maker valuation, i.e. q1−qα(v
+)
2q−δ−1
1−q as a function of the order size for diﬀerent
q, and diﬀerent q and δ, respectively (Panel B considers the same values for q as in Panel A but adds
perturbations to the value of δ). Panels C and D depict the analogous quantities for the bid price schedule
i.e. q1−qβ(v
−)
2q+δ−1
1−q . In all panels the constants α and β are ﬁxed to the same value equal to 0.01.
tightness decreases in δ is higher when there are more informed traders (q is small) i.e. when
the adverse selection problem faced by the market maker is more severe. Panel B shows
that the tightness increases as the share of uninformed agents increases, since the degree of
adverse selection in the market is reduced. These results imply that the introduction of a
Tobin Tax would: a) reduce market tightness; b) exacerbate the adverse selection problem
from the market maker (or limit order traders) perspective; and c) have more severe eﬀects
in markets with a high degree of adverse selection i.e. markets already characterised by low
tightness.
The market depth can be elicited from the ﬁrst derivative with respect to the order
size of the ask and bid price schedules in equations (13) and (14) of Proposition 4, and is
summarised in Figure 4. These derivatives (that in the ﬁgure are normalised by the market
maker’s valuation) are analogous to Kyle’s lambda i.e. they represent the sensitivity of prices
to order ﬂows, and are thus inversely related to market depth. The ﬁrst important thing to
notice is that, in our setting, market depth is generally not constant – it is instead a function
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of the order size.16 This is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding of Keim and Madhavan
(1996) that the price impact per unit trade is itself a function of the order size (see also Loeb
(1983) and Kavajecz (1999)).
Panels A and C show that there is a q∗ threshold such that the market depth is increasing
in the order size for q < q∗ and decreasing in the order size for q > q∗.17 This is due to the
fact that when q is high most of the traders are of the uninformed type hence, in this case,
the price will be more likely to deviate substantially from the fundamental value. Therefore,
the potential loss that the market maker would incur executing a large informed order is
high. On the contrary, when q is low, most traders are of the informed type, and the price
will be unlikely to deviate substantially from the fundamental value. Hence, the market
maker’s potential losses from executing a large order are substantially smaller. Given these
considerations, the market maker chooses a decreasing or increasing market depth depending
on the value of q.
Panels B and D show that, in the empirically relevant parameter range,18 variations in
δ have a very small eﬀect on market depth. Hence, the introduction of a Tobin Tax is not
likely to aﬀect this dimension of liquidity. This result is intuitive given that the concept
of market depth is about the relative willingness of executing small vs. large orders, and
this willingness is unlikely to be substantially aﬀected by a proportional, and small, trade
tax. Moreover, this result, taken together with the observation that trading costs have a
large impact on market tightness, suggests that the degree of asymmetric information in the
market could be better inferred empirically form its depth rather than the tightness.
The degree of market resilience can be inferred combining the trade-by-trade market
maker’s valuation update function in equation (15), with the limiting number of trades per
unit of time, limt→∞ L
p
t/t ≡ 1/μτ , in equation (44). The former has an half-life of deviations
from the fundamental value – on the trade-by-trade time scale – equal to log .5/ log q i.e. it
is decreasing in q and unaﬀected by δ.19 Scaling this quantity by the number of trades per
unit of time, we obtain the half-life of deviations from the fundamental value on the calendar
time scale i.e.
log 1/2
log q
μτ (47)
where μτ is the (limiting) expected inter-arrival time of trades deﬁned in equation (43).
16The derivative of the ask price with respect to the order size is constant if and only if q = .5 (1 + δ), and
the one of the bid price is constant if and only if q = .5 (1− δ).
17The q∗ threshold is equal to 1/2 + .5δ at ask and 1/2− .5δ at bid.
18See e.g. Stambaugh (2014) AFA presidential address.
19Rewriting equation (15) in deviation from the fundamental value, one obtains an AR(1) process for the
deviation of the market maker’s valuation from the fundamental value, with autoregressive coeﬃcient q and
shock proportional to the deviation of the i-th trader’s valuation from the fundamental one. Hence, the
h-period ahead impulse response function of a valuation shock is equal to qh times the shock, delivering the
half-life on the trade-by-trade time scale reported above.
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Figure 5: Expected inter-arrival time of trades (μτ , deﬁned in equation (43)) as a function of δ (Panel A)
and q (Panel B).
Since μτ is itself a function of q and δ, and resilience will inherit some of its properties (in
particular with respect to δ), it is useful to understand ﬁrst how the former varies when
parameters change.
Figure 5 depicts the expected inter-arrival time of trades as a function of δ (Panel A)
and q (Panel B). As one would intuit, the inter-arrival time is increasing in the transaction
friction δ (Panel A). This is simply due to the fact that bid-ask spreads are widening in
this quality, hence reducing the fraction of potential traders that, upon arrival, will decide
to trade (since an increase in this quantity widens the no trade region of informed, as well
as uninformed, traders). This is consistent with Umlauf (1993) that documents that the
introduction of a Tobin Tax in the Swedish stock market in the 80’s induced a reduction in
turnover i.e. in the average number of trades per unit time, 1/μτ .
More interestingly, the marginal eﬀect of an increase in δ is larger when q is lower, that
is when the market maker faces an higher degree of adverse selection. This is due to the fact
that, as outlined before, the rate at which market tightness decreases in δ is higher when
there are more informed traders (q is small). Panel B makes also clear that the expected
inter-arrival time is decreasing in q. This is due to the fact that, as the degree of adverse
selection is reduced, the market maker is more willing to trade, hence she increases market
tightness (see Panel B of Figure 3), therefore increasing the share of potential traders that,
upon arrival, choose to trade. Since the half-life of deviations of the specialist’s valuation
from the fundamental value in equation (47) depends upon δ only through μτ , the behaviour
of resilience as a function of δ mimics the one of the expected inter-arrival time. Hence,
resilience is decreasing in the degree of market friction δ, and this eﬀect is more pronounced
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Figure 6: Market resilience. Half life of the market maker’s valuation update in calendar time (i.e. inverse
market resilience) deﬁned in equation (47).
when the degree of adverse selection in the market is high (i.e. q is low) as depicted in Panel
A of Figure 6.
The eﬀect of a change in q on market resilience results from two counteracting forces. On
one hand, the speed of the trade-by-trade valuation update of the market maker in equation
(15) is accelerated as the share of informed agents increase (i.e. when q decreases). Hence, on
the trade time scale, half-life reduces and resilience increases. On the other hand, in response
to an increase in the degree of adverse selection, the specialist dealer reduces market tightness
(see Panel B of Figure 3). This in turn increases the average time between trades μτ (see
Panel B of Figure 5), hence it increases the calendar time half-life in equation (47), therefore
reducing resilience. The net eﬀect of these two opposing mechanisms, depicted in Panel B of
Figure 6, is dominated by the adverse selection motive. That is, the calendar time half-life
is decreasing, and resilience increasing, in q.
4.2 Equilibrium prices and volatility on diﬀerent time scales
We have already shown in equation (19), reported below for the reader’s convenience, that, at
very high frequency, there is an equilibrium relationship between log returns and movements
in volume:
log
Pt+s
Pt
=
Lt+s∑
i=Lt
{
log
(
1 + ξi
∣∣Vτi − Vτi−1∣∣γi)+ log c1,i + log c2,i−1} (48)
38
where c, γ and ξ are deﬁned in equation (18). This equation implies that, at high frequency,
the volatility of log returns is stochastic and is a function of
∣∣Vτi − Vτi−1∣∣.
Note that the above equilibrium result is consistent with the seminal works of Epps
and Epps (1976) and Tauchen and Pitts (1983) on the price-volume relationship and the
empirical ﬁndings of (among others) Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992), Andersen (1996),
and Chan and Fong (2000), that ﬁnd a strong (often non-linear) link between volume of trade
and price movements and between volume and price volatility.20 Furthermore, equation (19)
implies that if |ξi|
∣∣Vτi − Vτi−1∣∣γi is small (i.e. if the typical transaction size is small), than a
Taylor expansion would yield a power law relationship between order size and price growth
rates. This is coherent with the empirical ﬁndings of Farmer and Lillo (2004) and Farmer,
Lillo, and Mantegna (2003) that identify a log-linear relationship between gross price growth
and changes in volume. On the other hand, if the typical transaction size is large (i.e. if
|ξi|
∣∣Vτi − Vτi−1∣∣γi is large), a log-log relationship between gross price growth and volume
changes holds, which is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Potters and Bouchaud
(2003).
As the intensity of arrivals approaches inﬁnity – i.e. the medium time frequency – the
equilibrium price process is characterised in Theorem 7 and Corollary 1. In particular, the
limiting trade-by-trade variance of gross returns is δ
2(1−q2)
q2−δ2 . This quantity is depicted in
Panels A and B of Figure 7 as a function, respectively, of δ and q. The ﬁgure shows that
trade-by-trade volatility is increasing in the degree of trading friction δ, and that the marginal
eﬀect of an increase in δ is stronger when the degree of adverse selection faced by the market
maker is high (i.e. when q is low). This behaviour is consistent Jones and Seguin (1997) that
studies the eﬀect of the lowering of the 1975 negotiated commission on the U.S. national
stock exchange, and ﬁnds that the reduction in transaction cost is associated with a decline
in stock market volatility. Moreover, Panel B shows that this variance is also decreasing
in q. These behaviours are quite intuitive: as δ (q) increases (decreases) the market maker
reduces market tightness (and resilience), and this mechanically increases volatility of trade
prices.
Note that the trade-by-trade constant volatility does not imply constant volatility on the
calendar time scale, since: a) trade times – hence number of trades in a given time period
– are stochastic and endogenous, and b) prices (from equation (25) and Corollary 1) are
serially correlated. Indeed, equation (45) in Proposition 10 shows that at low frequency the
variance (between time s and t) is stochastic and given by (Lpt − Lps) σ2μτ – that is, number
of trades is the driver of stochastic volatility at this frequency as found in the empirical
works of Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994).21 Or, more precisely, in our setting low frequency
20See also Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992) and, for a survey of the empirical studies on the price,
volume, and volatility relation, Karpoﬀ (1987).
21See also Dufour and Engle (2000).
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Figure 7: Limiting Variances. Variance on the trade by trade (upper panels) and number of trades (lower
panels) time scales as a function of δ (left panels) and q (right panels).
log returns follow a Brownian motion time changed by the number of trades process. This is
analogous to the empirical ﬁnding of Ane´ and Geman (2000) that ﬁnd empirically that the
distribution of log returns conditional on the number of trades is Gaussian and has constant
volatility – this is precisely our result in equation (45) of Proposition 10, and the resulting
(low frequency) constant volatility on the trade time scale (μτσ
2) is depicted in Panels C
and D of Figure 7. The two Panels show that the volatility of the price process, scaled by
the (square root of) the number of trades has an almost identical behaviour as the trade-by-
trade volatility in Panels A and B. Moreover, the rationale of this behaviour is analogous to
the one described above for Panels A and B. One thing worth stressing is that the variances
in the upper and lower panels of the ﬁgure, although very similar, are not identical – this
discrepancy is due to the equilibrium autocorrelation of log returns.
Note that the above results on the equilibrium volatility have been obtained in a setting
in which the fundamental was assumed to have constant volatility. This suggests that, if
the fundamental volatility where to be time varying, the endogenous stochastic volatility
mechanism outlined in our model would amplify this time variation.
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4.3 Liquidity and volatility co-movements
We have seen above that the deep parameters of the model – namely, the degree of adverse
selection on the market (measured by 1 − q) and the degree of other transaction frictions
(captured by the parameter δ) – have ﬁrst order eﬀects on the equilibrium liquidity and
volatility of the market that are consistent with the empirical literature. Therefore, a natural
question is whether changes in these market fundamental characteristics can explain the co-
movements of the liquidity measures and volatility documented in the empirical literature.
Indeed, the equilibrium liquidity measures discussed in Section 4.1 are not only individu-
ally, but also jointly consistent with the empirical evidence on the co-movement of diﬀerent
liquidity measures and trading activity. For instance, Dufour and Engle (2000) document
a systematic comovement of the time duration between transactions, the price impact of
trades, and the speed of price adjustment to trade-related information, and interpret the re-
sulting reduction in liquidity as being induced by an increased presence of informed traders.
In our setting, a change in the degree of adverse selection in the market (measured by 1− q),
manifests itself via exactly these joint changes in the behaviour of equilibrium liquidity.22
Furthermore, in our model, an increase in adverse selection alsos cause an increase in volatil-
ity on both the trade-by-trade and number of trades time scale as illustrated in Figure 7.
That is, our model is capable of generating joint liquidity dry-ups and volatility spikes in
response to an increase in the degree of market adverse selection as, for instance, during the
subprime crises.
Moreover, in our equilibrium characterisation, an increase in trading costs – as e.g. the
introduction of a Tobin Tax or an increase in trading fees – reduces both market tightness
and resilience, and increases volatility on the various time scales, as documented empirically
e.g. by Jones and Seguin (1997), Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) and Umlauf (1993). And
this eﬀect, as outlined in previous sections, is stronger in markets characterised by a higher
degree of adverse selection.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a tractable, asymmetric information based, equilibrium trading model,
in which the distribution of the prices process, its volatility, the limit order book, the trad-
ing activity, as well as the various dimensions of market liquidity, are all characterised as
functions of fundamental (trading and informational) frictions. The results derived provide
micro-foundations for, and a rationalisation of, a large set of empirical ﬁndings including
22E.g. Dufour and Engle (2000) ﬁnd that “as the time duration between transactions decreases, the price
impact of [large] trades, the speed of price adjustment to trade-related information [...] all increase,” and
exactly this joint behaviour would arise in our setting in response to an increase in q.
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the presence of (stochastic) volatility clustering, and a price volatility, volume, and trading
activity link. Moreover, the framework developed constitute a natural laboratory for the
analysis of the equilibrium impact of a Tobin tax, and delivers predictions consistent with
the empirical evidence on this topic, as well as novel insights.
Methodologically, the multiple time scales and the limiting characterisation approach of
the corresponding market equilibria, developed in this paper, could also be extended (with
appropriate modiﬁcations) to study very diﬀerent economic problems: e.g. from the eﬀect
of high frequency trading in ﬁnancial markets, to the modelling of time and state contingent
price setting in sticky prices, wages, and information, macroeconomic models.
Furthermore, our characterisation of the equilibrium price process, liquidity, trading ac-
tivity, and volatility, at diﬀerent frequencies, and as a function of the fundamental trading
and informational frictions, naturally opens two important directions for future research.
First, our asymptotic characterisations, that are in nature of the market microstructure
invariance type (see e.g. Kyle and Obizhaeva (2011a, 2001b)), raise a natural question: at
what (calendar time) speed do the equilibrium processes converge (on the diﬀerent time
scales considered) to the equilibria that we have derived? These speeds of convergence
should be functions of the fundamental trading (δ) and informational (q) frictions on the
market. Hence these frictions should, also through this channel, inﬂuence the (calendar)
time series of market dynamics and risk. The task of analysing these speeds of convergence
is complicated by the fact that an obvious metric for quantifying the speed of convergence
between distributions is not readily available. Nevertheless, a potentially promising metric
is the relative entropy, as a function of the fundamental frictions, between the equilibrium
price distributions at any given frequency and the next, lower frequency, distribution. For
instance, the half-life of the relative entropy (or generalised variance) discrepancy would be
a relevant statistic to construct in order to understand how ﬁnancial risk is generated.23
Second, our closed form characterisations of the price process, liquidity, trading activity,
limit order book, and volatility, as a function of the fundamental frictions, oﬀer a natural
approach for the investigation of the empirical relevance of these channels in driving ﬁnancial
market dynamics, and for the estimation of the fundamental market characteristics that
generates them. Moreover, for a richer empirical analysis, the framework derived in this
paper could be generalized to accommodate time varying fundamental volatility, time varying
degree of adverse selection, and time varying trading costs (as e.g. the time varying margins
– aka “haircuts” – studied in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)).
Both of the above extensions are promising, although demanding, tasks, and we defer
them to future work.
23For an application of relative entropy divergences to the analysis of risk measures see e.g. Julliard and
Ghosh (2012) and Ghosh, Julliard, and Taylor (2011).
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional Proofs and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 4. Given the market maker’s indiﬀerence conditions (9) and (10) and
Lemma 1, it follows from Bayes rule that
At
(
v+
)
(1− δ) =
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−}
{
P
[
I˜i|H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi
]
E
[
eDT |H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi , I˜i
]
+
P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi
]
E
[
eDT |H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi , U˜i
]}∣∣∣
v˜i=v+,τi=t
,
=
(
1− qt
(
v+
)) [
At
(
v+
)
+ vA′t
(
v+
)]
+ qt
(
v+
)
Xt
(
v+
)
(49)
Bt
(
v−
)
(1 + δ) =
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−}
{
P
[
I˜i|H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi
]
E
[
eDT |H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi , I˜i
]
+
P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi
]
E
[
eDT |H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi , U˜i
]}∣∣∣
v˜i=v−,τi=t
=
(
1− qt
(−v−)) [Bt (v−)+ vB′t (v−)]+ qt (−v−)Xt (−v−) (50)
where I˜i (U˜i) denotes the event of the i-th trader being informed (uninformed) and
qt (v) =
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−} P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi
]∣∣∣
v˜i=v,τi=t
Xt (v) =
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−} E
[
eDT |H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi , U˜i
]∣∣∣
v˜i=v,τi=t
where qt (v) is the probability of the time t trader being uninformed and Xt (v) is the time t market
maker valuation given that the current trader is uninformed. Note that in the above equation the
market maker uses the trader’s valuation of the asset (from Lemma 1) only in the case of the trader
being informed.
Recall that, from Remark (1) and (2), we have that H˜Mi = σ
{
{v˜}ij=0 , {τj}ij=0
}
and Hi =
σ
{
{v}ij=0 , {θj}ij=0
}
. This observation allows us to rewrite the marker maker’s probability of the
trader being uninformed as P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi
]
= P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi−1, v˜i, τi, Nτi = Lτi
]
.
Note that from Bayes rule, for any C ∈ B (R) we have
P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi−1, v˜i ∈ C, τi, Nτi = Lτi
]
=
P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi−1, τi, Nτi = Lτi
]
P[v˜i∈C|H˜Mi−1,τi,Nτi=Lτi ]
P[v˜i∈C|H˜Mi−1,τi,Nτi=Lτi ,U˜i]
. (51)
From A4 and the fact that
{
H˜Mi−1 ∨ σ
{
τi, U˜i
}}
∩ {Nτi = Lτi} = {Hi−1 ∨ σ {θi, Ui}} ∩ {Nτi = Lτi} (52)
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it follows that Equation (51) simpliﬁes to
P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi−1, v˜i ∈ C, τi, Nτi = Lτi
]
= P
[
U˜i|H˜Mi−1, τi, Nτi = Lτi
]
since P
[
v˜i ∈ C|H˜Mi−1, τi, Nτi = Lτi
]
= P
[
v˜i ∈ C|H˜Mi−1, τi, Nτi = Lτi , U˜i
]
.
Finally, from Assumption A3 and the equality (52), we have that the arrival of an uninformed
agent, U˜i, is independent from H˜i−1 and τi, therefore
qt (v) := P
[
U˜i|H˜i−1, τi, Nτi = Lτi
]
= q.
Using equality(52), and the fact that the signal received by the uniformed trader is conditionally
independent (A2), we have that Xt (v) = Z
M
t since
Xt (v) =
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−} E
[
eDT |H˜Mi , Nτi = Lτi , U˜i
]∣∣∣
v˜i=v,τi=t
=
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−} E
[
eDT |H˜Mi−1, v˜i, τi, Nτi = Lτi , U˜i
]∣∣∣
v˜i=v,τi=t
=
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−} E
[
E
[
eDT |H˜Mi−1, Sτi , τi, Nτi = Lτi , U˜i
]
|H˜Mi−1, v˜i, τi, Nτi = Lτi , U˜i
]∣∣∣
v˜i=v,τi=t
=
∞∑
i=1
1{i=1+Lt−}E
[
eDT |H˜Mi−1, Nt = Lt
]
=
∞∑
i=0
1{i=Lt−+1}E
[
eDT
∣∣GMτi−1 , Nt = Lt]
=
∞∑
i=0
1{i=Lt−+1}Z
M
τi−1
Therefore Equations (49) and (50) simplify to the following ordinary diﬀerential equations
At (v) (1− δ) = (1− q)
[
At (v) + vA
′
t (v)
]
+ q
∞∑
i=0
1{i=Lt−+1}Z
M
τi−1 ,
Bt (v) (1 + δ) = (1− q)
[
Bt (v) + vB
′
t (v)
]
+ q
∞∑
i=0
1{i=Lt−+1}Z
M
τi−1 .
These, up to a generic constant, have three solutions each, but only one solution per equation
satisﬁes conditions C2 and C3. These solutions are the ones in equations (13) and (14). These
solutions clearly satisfy conditions C2-C5, and C1 is satisﬁed because
∑∞
i=0 1{i=Lt−+1}Z
M
τi−1 is a
ca´dla´g process.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof is by induction on i.
I. i = 1. Then
P
[
dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1
]
= qP
[
dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1, U1
]
+ (1− q)P [dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1, I1]
since, due to A3, P [U1|H0, θ1] = q. From equation (24) and Remark 3 it follows that
47
P
[
dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1, U1
]
= P
[
dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1, I1
]
. Therefore
P
[
dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1
]
= P
[
dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1, I1
]
. (53)
On the other hand, we have
P
[
dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1, I1
]
= P [D0 + (Dθ1 −D0) ≤ x|H0, θ1, I1]
= P [D0 + (Dθ1 −D0) ≤ x|H0, θ1] (54)
= P
[
dtr0 + ε1,0 ≤ x|dtr0 ,Δ1,0
]
since Dθ1 −D0 is a Brownian motion increment and, due to assumption A3, this Brownian
motion is independent of θ and I. Note also that Equations (53) and (54) imply
P
[
dtr1 ≤ x|H0, θ1
]
= P [Dθ1 ≤ x|H0, θ1]
II. Suppose the statement is true for i = n. Consider i = n+ 1, then
P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1
]
= qP
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, Un+1
]
+ (1− q)P [dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In+1]
(55)
= P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In+1
]
. (56)
since, due to A3, P [Un+1|Hn, θn+1] = q, and from Remark 3 we know that
P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In+1
]
= P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, Un+1
]
.
we also have
P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In+1
]
= P
[
Dθn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In+1
]
= P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In+1
]
.
Note that from assumption A3 In+1 ⊥ FN,D,ST ∨ (Uj)j =n+1 ∀n. Since Hn ∨ σ {θn+1} ∨
σ
{
Dθn+1 −Dθn
} ∨ σ {Dθn} ⊂ FN,D,ST ∨ (Uj)j =n+1 we have
In+1 ⊥ Hn ∨ σ {θn+1} ∨ σ
{
Dθn+1 −Dθn
} ∨ σ {Dθn} ∀n.
Therefore, from Proposition 6.8 of Kallenberg (2002), we have that, ∀n, In+1 ⊥Hn∨σ{θn+1}
σ
{
Dθn+1 −Dθn
} ∨ σ {Dθn} , and from Proposition 6.6. of Kallenberg (2002) it follows that
P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In+1
]
= P
[
Dθn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1
]
. (57)
Note that the above and Equation (56) imply P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1
]
= P
[
Dθn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1
]
.
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Moreover
P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In+1
]
= P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1
]
= (1− q)P [Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In]+qP [Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, Un]
(58)
where the last equality simply follows from Bayes rule and that Assumption A3, and the fact
that Hn ∨ σ {θn+1} ⊂ FN,D,ST ∨ (Uj)j =n+1, imply that P [Un|Hn, θn+1] = q.
Note that the In agent knows Dθn , therefore
P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In
]
= P
[
dtr
n
+Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In
]
= P
[
dtr
n
+ σ
(
Wθn+1 −Wθn
)
+ μΔn+1,n ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In
]
= P
[
dtr
n
+ σ
(
Wθn+1 −Wθn
)
+ μΔn+1,n ≤ x|Hn, θn+1
]
.
where the last equality follows from assumption A3 and the fact that Hn ∨ σ {θn+1} ∨
σ
{
Wθn+1 −Wθn
} ⊂ FN,D,ST ∨ (Uj)j =n+1, hence we can use use once more Proposition 6.6
and 6.8 of Kallenberg (2002).
Let deﬁne W˜nt := Wθn+t − Wθn and N˜nt := Nθn+t − Nθn . From Assumption A2, and the
fact that W is a Brownian motion with respect to (Ft)t≥0, we have FW˜
n ⊥
Hn
F N˜n , and
FW˜n ⊥ Hn. Therefore, from Proposition 6.8 of Kallenberg (2002) the above is equivalent
to FW˜n ⊥ F N˜n ∨ Hn. Since from Assumption A1 F N˜n ⊥ Hn, it follows from the deﬁ-
nition of independence that F N˜n ∨ FW˜n ⊥ Hn. Since σ
{
Wθn+1 −Wθn
} ∨ σ {Δn+1,n} ⊂
F N˜n ∨ FW˜n , the above independence and Proposition 6.8 of Kallenberg (2002) implies
σ
{
Wθn+1 −Wθn
} ⊥
σ{Δn+1,n}
Hn. Thus, we have by Proposition 6.6 of Kallenberg (2002)
that
P
[
dtr
n
+ σ
(
Wθn+1 −Wθn
)
+ μΔn+1,n ≤ x|Hn, θn+1
]
= P
[
dtr
n
+ εn+1,n ≤ x|dtrn ,Δn+1,n
]
where εn+1,n := μΔn+1,n + σ
√
Δn+1,nηn+1,n and ηn+1,n ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of dtrn and
Δn+1,n for all n. Therefore
P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, In
]
= P
[
dtr
n
+ εn+1,n ≤ x|dtrn ,Δn+1,n
]
. (59)
To complete the characterisation of Equation (55) we now simplify P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, Un+1
]
.
Observe that
P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, Un
]
= E
[
P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn−1, θn+1, θn, Un, Sn
] |Hn, θn+1, Un]
= P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn−1, θn+1, θn
]
49
where the last equality is due to Assumptions A2 and A3. Using Propositions 6.6 and 6.8 of
Kallenberg (2002) in the same fashion as above, we have
P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, Un
]
= P [Dθn + εn+1,n ≤ x|Hn−1, θn+1, θn] (60)
where εn+1,n := μΔn+1,n+σ
√
Δn+1,nηn+1,n and ηn+1,n ∼ N (0, 1) is independent ofHn−1, θn+1, θn
and FDθn .
To complete the induction recall that in Assumption A2 FWT ⊥Hi−1 F
N
T . Since σ {θn} ∨
σ {θn+1} ⊂ FNT we have FWT ⊥Hi−1 σ {θn}∨σ {θn+1}. Thus, from Proposition 6.8 and Corollary
6.7 of Kallenberg (2002) we have that FWT ∨ σ {θn} ⊥Hi−1,σ{θn} σ {θn+1}, and since σ {Dθn} ⊂
FWT ∨ σ {θn}, we have σ {Dθn} ⊥Hi−1,σ{θn} σ {θn+1}. Therefore, for any χ
P [Dθn ≤ χ|Hn−1, θn+1, θn] = P [Dθn ≤ χ|Hn−1, θn] = P
[
dtrn ≤ χ|Hn−1, θn
]
= (1− q)
n−1∑
j=1
qn−1−jP
[
dtrj + εn,j ≤ x|dtrj ,Δn,j
]
+
+ qn−1P
[
dtr0 + εn,0 ≤ x|dtr0 ,Δn,0
]
where the last two equalities are due to the induction assumption that also imply εn,j :=
μΔn,j + σ
√
Δn,jηn,j , and ηn,j ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of dtrj and Δn,j for all j < n.
Thus Equation (60) becomes
P
[
Dθn +Dθn+1 −Dθn ≤ x|Hn, θn+1, Un
]
= (1− q)
n−1∑
j=1
qn−1−jP
[
dtrj + εn,j + εn+1,n ≤ x|dtrj ,Δn,j ,Δn+1,n
]
+
+ qn−1P
[
dtr0 + εn,0 + εn+1,n ≤ x|dtr0 ,Δn,0,Δn+1,n
]
= (1− q)
n−1∑
j=1
qn−1−jP
[
dtrj + εn+1,j ≤ x|dtrj ,Δn+1,j
]
+ qn−1P
[
dtr0 + εn+1,0 ≤ x|dtr0 ,Δn+1,0
]
since all the ε’s are independent Gaussians.
Combining the above equation with equations (59), (58), and (56) yields
P
[
dtrn+1 ≤ x|Hn, θn+1
]
= (1− q)
n∑
j=1
qn−jP
[
dtrj + εn+1,j ≤ x|dtrj ,Δn+1,j
]
+
+ qnP
[
dtr0 + εn+1,0 ≤ x|dtr0 ,Δn+1,0
]
.
By the principle of mathematical induction the proof is complete.
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Proof of Corollary 1. To prove the corollary we need to compute the probability that, given
that a trade occurred, it is at ask or bid. Let
(FWt ) be the natural ﬁltration of W augmented in
the usual way. Since W is a Brownian motion with respect to a (potentially) larger ﬁltration, it is
also a Brownian motion with respect to
(FWt ). Then,
P
[
σ
(
Wτi −Wτi−1
)− σ2
2
(τi − τi−1) = a
(
q
φi−1
+ 1− q
)
|FWτi−1
]
= P
[
σWτ − σ
2
2
τ = a (x)
]
x= q
φi−1+1−q
where the equality follows from the strong Markov property of Brownian motion, and where
τ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : σWt − σ
2
2
t /∈ [b (x) , a (x)]
}
.
Note that Mt := exp
{
σWt − σ22 t
}
is a martingale and τ ∧ s is a bounded stopping time for every
ﬁxed s. Thus, EMτ∧s = 1 by Doob’s optional sampling theorem (see Revuz and Yor (1999) Th.
3.2 Ch. II). Since Mτ∧s is bounded for all s, we can use the dominated convergence theorem to
obtain that EMτ = 1. Thus we have
P
[
σWτ − σ
2
2
τ = a (x)
]
=
1− eb(x)
ea(x) − eb(x) =
q2 − δ2 − q (q − δ)x
2qδx
since Mτ can take only value exp {a (x)} or exp {b (x)} . Hence φi has the stated distribution and
the conditional moments follow from simple direct calculations.
Proof of Lemma 5. To show the continuity of the map over the set C, we need to show
that for any fn → f ∈ C in Skorokhod topology, we’ll have P2fn → P2f in Skorokhod topol-
ogy. Due to Theorem VI.1.14 of Jacod and Shiryaev (2003), to establish the result it is enough to
demonstrate that there exist a sequence of continuos functions ρn : R+ → R+ that are strictly
increasing with ρn (0) = 0 and limt→∞ ρn (t) = ∞, such that: supt∈R+ |ρn (t)− t| → 0, and
supt∈R+ |P2fn (ρn (t))− P2f (t)| → 0.
Suppose that, for any ε˜ > 0 we can show that there exists N¯ such that, for any n ≥ N¯ , we have
LnT := L
fn
T = L
f
T , (61)
max
i=0,...,LfT
∣∣∣τni − τ fi ∣∣∣ ≤ ε˜Kτ4T (62)
max
i=0,...,LfT
∣∣∣∣gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)∣∣∣∣ < ε˜ (63)
where τn := τ f
n
, gn := gf
n
. Under the above conditions, we can deﬁne
ρn (t) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
τni −τni−1
τfi −τfi−1
(
t− τ fi−1
)
+ τni−1, for t ∈
[
τ fi−1, τ
f
i
]
, i = 1, ..., LfT + 1,
t, for t ≥ T
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with the convention that τn
LfT+1
= τ f
LfT+1
= T . Note that this ρn is continuous and strictly increasing
on [0, T ], ρn (0) = 0, limt→∞ ρn (t) = ∞, and that
sup
t∈R+
|ρn (t)− t| = max
i=1,...,LfT+1
∣∣∣∣∣τ
n
i − τni−1
τ fi − τ fi−1
(
t− τ fi−1
)
+ τni−1 − t
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4T εKτ < ε˜
and
sup
t∈R+
|P2fn (ρn (t))− P2f (t)| = max
i=0,...,LfT
∣∣∣∣gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)∣∣∣∣ < ε˜,
since that both P2fn and P2f are constant, respectively, on
(
τni−1, τ
n
i
)
and
(
τ fi−1, τ
f
i
)
, as well as
after τn
LfT
and τ f
LfT
. Thus, P2 would satisfy the convergence requirement if conditions (61)-(63) are
fulﬁlled.
To show that conditions (61)-(63) are indeed satisﬁed for big enough n, consider
K1 =
1
2
min
{
log
q + δ
q − δ ;− log
q (1− δ)
q + δ
; log
q (1 + δ)
q − δ
}
.
Since the function f is continuos, for any i there exist strictly positive constants εli and ε
r
i such
that:
• if i ≥ 1 and f
(
τ fi
)
= f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ a (c2,i−1) (i.e. the bound is crossed at the ask)
min
t∈
[
τfi −εli, τfi +εri
] f (t) ≥ f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ a (c2,i−1)−K1
• if i ≥ 1 and f
(
τ fi
)
= f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ b (c2,i−1) (i.e. the bound is crossed at the bid)
max
t∈
[
τfi −εli, τfi +εri
] f (t) ≤ f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ a (c2,i−1)−K1
• if i = 0, max
t∈
[
τf0 ,τ
f
0 +ε
r
0
] |f (t)− f (0)| < K1.
Choose ετ = min
{
min
i∈1,...,LfT
{
εli; ε
r
i
}
; εr0;
1
3Kτ ;
1
2
ε˜Kτ
4T
}
and deﬁne
K2 = min
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
min
i=1,...,LfT
min
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
inf
t∈
[
τfi−1+ετ , τ
f
i −ετ
] ∣∣∣f(t)− f (τ fi−1)− a(cf2,i−1)∣∣∣ ;
inf
t∈
[
τfi−1+ετ , τ
f
i −ετ
] ∣∣∣f(t)− f (τ fi−1)− b(cf2,i−1)∣∣∣
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ ;
min
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
inf
t∈
[
τf
L
f
T
+ετ ,T
]
∣∣∣∣f(t)− f
(
τ f
LfT
)
− a
(
cf
2,LfT
)∣∣∣∣ ;
inf
t∈
[
τf
L
f
T
+ετ ,T
]
∣∣∣∣f(t)− f
(
τ f
LfT
)
− b
(
cf
2,LfT
)∣∣∣∣
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
,
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κi :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
inf
t∈
[
τfi −ετ , τfi +ετ
] (f (τ fi )+ a(cf2,i)− f(t)) , if f (τ fi ) = f (τ fi−1)+ a (c2,i−1)
inf
t∈
[
τfi −ετ , τfi +ετ
] (f(t)− f (τ fi )− b(cf2,i)) , if f (τ fi ) = f (τ fi−1)+ b (c2,i−1) ,
K3 := min
i=1,...,LfT
κi,
χi :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
sup
t∈
[
τfi , τ
f
i +ε
τ
] (f(t)− f (τ fi−1)− a(cf2,i−1)) , if f (τ fi ) = f (τ fi−1)+ a (c2,i−1)
sup
t∈
[
τfi , τ
f
i +ε
τ
] (f (τ fi−1)+ b(cf2,i−1)− f(t)) , if f (τ fi ) = f (τ fi−1)+ b (c2,i−1)
K4 := min
i=1,...,LfT
χi.
Note that Kj > 0, j = 1, .., 4, given our choice of ε
τ and since f ∈ C.
Deﬁne the constants
M := max
[0,T ]
ef(t)
2 (1 + δq)
1− δ , m := max
{
max
[0,T ]
e−f(t); 1
}
,
K :=
1
4
min
{
K4; K2;
K1
2Mm+ 1
; log 2;
1
Mm
;
K3
2Mm+ 1
}
,
Ci :=
i∑
j=1
max {(2Mm) , 1}j +max
{
(2Mm)i , 1
}
, i = 0, ..., LfT ,
C := CL
f
T+1
Let εf = 14 min {ε˜, 1}min
{
K
C+1 , 1
}
.
Since fn → f ∈ C in Skorokhod topology, therefore in uniform topology over [0, T ], there exists
a N¯ such that, for any n > N¯ , sup
t∈[0,T ]
|fn (t)− f (t)| < εf . For such n, conditions (61)-(63) are
indeed satisﬁed as we are about to show. To prove this we are left to show by induction that, for
all i,
∣∣∣τ fi − τni ∣∣∣ < ετ , τni > τ fi−1 + ετ , (64)
cf2,i = c
n
2,i := c
fn
2,i (65)∣∣∣f (τ fi )− log gn (τni )∣∣∣ ≤ Ciεf (66)∣∣∣∣gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)∣∣∣∣ < 2MCiεf (67)
and that LnT = L
f
T .
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Consider i = 0. We have τ f0 = τ
n
0 = 0, c
f
2,0 = c
n
2,0 = 1, and∣∣∣f (τ f0 )− log gn (τn0 )∣∣∣ ≤ C0εf (since log gn (τn0 ) = fn (τn0 ) ),∣∣∣∣gn (τn0 )− ef
(
τf0
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ M
∣∣∣∣elog gn(τn0 )−f
(
τf0
)
− 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2Mεf .
To show that τn1 > τ
f
0 + ε
τ note that, for t ∈ [0, ετ ]
a (1) + fn (0)− fn (t) ≥ a (1)− 2εf −K1 ≥ a (1)− 9
8
K1
= log
q
q − δ −
9
8
K1 ≥ 7
8
log
q
q − δ
due to the choice of εf and K1. Similarly
fn (t)− b (1)− fn (0) ≥ 7
8
log
q
q + δ
for t ∈ [0, ετ ] .
Thus, τn1 > τ
f
0 + ε
τ .
Suppose the assumptions of induction hold for i− 1.
• To show that τni > τ fi − ετ , observe that, for t ∈
[
τ fi−1 + ε
τ , τ fi − ετ
]
,
a (c2,i−1) + fn
(
τni−1
)− fn (t) ≥ K2 − 2εf ≥ 7
8
K2
fn (t)− b (τni−1)− fn (τni−1) ≥ 78K2
due to the choice of εf and K2. Thus τ
n
i > τ
f
i − ετ .
• Next, to show that τni ∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
, we need two observations. First, note that if
f
(
τ fi
)
= f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ a (c2,i−1) (i.e. the bound is crossed at ask), then
inf
t∈
[
τfi −ετ , τfi +ετ
] [a (c2,i−1) + log gn (τni−1)− fn (t)]
≤ inf
t∈
[
τfi −ετ , τfi +ετ
]
[
a (c2,i−1) + f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ Ci−1εf − f (t) + εf
]
≤ Cεf + εf −K4 ≤ 1
4
K −K4 ≤ −15
16
K4 < 0,
hence fn crosses its upper boundary in this interval whenever f crossed at ask.
Second, note that if f
(
τ fi
)
= f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ b (c2,i−1) (i.e. the bound is crossed at bid), we have
inf
t∈
[
τfi −ετ , τfi +ετ
] [fn (t)− b (c2,i−1)− log gn (τni−1)] ≤ −1516K4 < 0.
Hence, fn crosses its lower boundary in this interval whenever f crossed at bid.
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As a consequence, fn crosses one of its bounds over this interval i.e. τni ∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
,
and obviously
∣∣∣τ fi − τni ∣∣∣ < ετ .
• To show that cf2,i = cn2,i i.e. that fn crosses at ask (bid) whenever f does so, we need two
observations. First, note that if f
(
τ fi
)
= f
(
τ fi−1
)
+a (c2,i−1), then for t ∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
fn (t)− b (c2,i−1)− log gn
(
τni−1
) ≥ f (t)− 2εf − b (c2,i−1)− Ci−1εf − f (τ fi−1)
≥ f (t)− 2εf + log q + δ
q − δ − a (c2,i−1)− C
i−1εf − f
(
τ fi−1
)
≥ 13
16
K1 > 0.
That is the i-th trade at time τni cannot happen at bid in this case.
Second, note that if f
(
τ fi
)
= f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ b (c2,i−1), then for t ∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
a (c2,i−1) + log gn
(
τni−1
)− fn (t) ≥ 13
16
K1 > 0,
hence the i-th trade at time τni cannot happen at ask in this case.
Therefore, cf2,i = c
n
2,i.
• To verify the induction statements (66) and (67) we need to consider two cases. First, if
fn (τni ) > a (c2,i−1) + log g
n
(
τni−1
)
(i.e. fn crossed its bound at ask), then
fn (τni ) > a (c2,i−1) + log g
n
(
τni−1
) ≥ f (τ fi )− 2Ci−1εf .
Moreover, since fn cannot have jumps larger than 2εf (since otherwise its distance from f
would become more than εf ), and since fn should be below its upper bound before crossing
it, we have
fn (τni ) ≤ a (c2,i−1) + log gn
(
τni−1
)
+ 2εf ≤ f
(
τ fi
)
+ 2
(
Ci−1 + 1
)
εf .
Therefore, |fn (τni )− f (τni )| ≤ 2
(
Ci−1 + 1
)
εf . This implies that
∣∣∣∣gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)∣∣∣∣ = 1c2,i
∣∣∣∣
[
(1− q)
(
ef
n(τni ) − ef
(
τfi
))
+ q
(
gn
(
τni−1
)− ef(τfi−1)) c2,i−1
]∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
c2,i
[
(1− q) ef
(
τfi
) ∣∣∣∣efn(τni )−f
(
τfi
)
− 1
∣∣∣∣+ qef
(
τfi
) ∣∣∣∣elog gn(τni−1)−f
(
τfi−1
)
− 1
∣∣∣∣ c2,i−1
]
≤ 2e
f
(
τfi
)
c2,i
[
(1− q)
∣∣∣fn (τni )− f (τ fi )∣∣∣+ q ∣∣∣log gn (τni−1)− f (τ fi−1)∣∣∣ c2,i−1]
≤ 4e
f
(
τfi
)
1− δ [1 + qδ] ε
f
(
Ci−1 + 1
) ≤ 2Mεf (Ci−1 + 1)
where the third inequality is due to the fact that |ex − 1| < 2 |x| whenever |x| ≤ εf (Ci−1 + 1) <
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log 2. Hence
∣∣∣∣gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)∣∣∣∣ < 2MCiεf as claimed in the induction. Furthermore
∣∣∣log gn (τni )− f (τ fi )∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
⎛
⎝1 + gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)
e
f
(
τfi
)
⎞
⎠
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)
e
f
(
τfi
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2Mm (Ci−1 + 1) εf ≤ Ciεf
since |log (1 + x)| ≤ 2 |x| for |x| ≤ 2Mm (Ci−1 + 1) εf ≤ Ciεf < 1/2.
Second, if fn (τni ) < b (c2,i−1)+log g
n
(
τni−1
)
(i.e. fn crossed its bound at bid), then fn (τni ) ≤
f
(
τ fi
)
+ 2Ci−1εf . Moreover, we have that fn (τni ) ≥ f
(
τ fi
)
− 2 (Ci−1 + 1) εf . Therefore,
|fn (τni )− f (τni )| ≤ 2
(
Ci−1 + 1
)
εf . This implies that
∣∣∣∣gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2Mεf (Ci−1 + 1) ,
therefore
∣∣∣∣gn (τni )− ef
(
τfi
)∣∣∣∣ < 2MCiεf as claimed in the induction. Hence, as before,
∣∣∣log gn (τni )− f (τ fi )∣∣∣ ≤ Ciεf .
• To show that fn does not cross more than once one of its boundaries on the interval[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
, i.e. τni+1 > τ
f
i + ε
τ , we need the following two observations.
First, if fn (τni ) > a (c2,i−1) + log g
n
(
τni−1
)
, this implies that (as shown above) f
(
τ fi
)
=
a (c2,i−1) + f
(
τ fi−1
)
, therefore for t ∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
fn (t)− b (c2,i)− log gn (τni ) ≥ f (t)− εf − b (c2,i)− f
(
τ fi
)
− Ciεf
≥ f
(
τ fi−1
)
− f
(
τ fi
)
+ a (c2,i−1)− b (c2,i)−K1 −
(
Ci + 1
)
εf
= − log q (1− δ)
q + δ
−K1 −
(
Ci + 1
)
εf ≥ 15
16
K1 > 0.
Hence, if τni+1 ∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
, it cannot happen at bid. On the other hand,
a (c2,i) + log g
n (τni )− fn (t) ≥ a (c2,i) + f
(
τ fi
)
− f (t)− εf − Ciεf
≥ K3 −
(
Ci + 1
)
εf ≥ 15
16
K3 > 0.
Hence, if τni+1 ∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
, it cannot happen at ask either. Thus, τni+1 /∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
.
Second, if fn (τni ) < b (c2,i−1) + log g
n
(
τni−1
)
, this implies that (as shown above) f
(
τ fi
)
=
56
b (c2,i−1) + f
(
τ fi−1
)
, therefore for t ∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
a (c2,i) + log g
n (τni )− fn (t) ≥ a (c2,i) + f
(
τ fi
)
− f (t)− εf − Ciεf
≥ a (c2,i) + f
(
τ fi−1
)
+ b (c2,i−1)− f (t)−
(
Ci + 1
)
εf
≥ log q (1 + δ)
q − δ −K1 −
(
Ci + 1
)
εf ≥ 15
16
K1 > 0.
Also
fn (t)− b (c2,i)− log gn (τni ) ≥ f (t)− b (c2,i)− f
(
τ fi
)
− εf − Ciεf ≥ 15
16
K3 > 0.
Therefore, τni+1 /∈
[
τ fi − ετ , τ fi + ετ
]
in this case too.
• Thus, by the principle of mathematical induction, the statements (64)-(65) hold for i =
1, ..., LfT .
To complete the proof of the Lemma, we need to establish that LfT = L
n
T for n > N¯ . By
the above we have that Lft = L
n
t for any t ≤ τ fLfT + ε
τ , thus the only thing left to show is that
τn
LfT+1
/∈
[
τ f
LfT
+ ετ , T
)
. Observe that, for t ∈
[
τ f
LfT
+ ετ , T
)
, and i = LfT
a (c2,i) + f
n (τni )− fn (t) ≥ K2 − 2εf ≥
7
8
K2,
fn (t)− b (c2,i)− fn (τni ) ≥
7
8
K2.
Thus τn
LfT+1
≥ T .
Proof of Lemma 6. We ﬁrst derive the conditional expectation of time between two consec-
utive trades. In particular we will prove that the following conjecture holds for all i > j ≥ 1
E
[
τi − τi−1 − μτ | FWτi−j
]
=
⎧⎨
⎩
S(q + δ)(1 + δ)
(
q2−δ2
q(1−δ2)
)j−1
, if φi−j = qq−δ
−S(q − δ)(1− δ)
(
q2−δ2
q(1−δ2)
)j−1
, if φi−j = qq+δ
(68)
where μτ is deﬁned in Lemma 6 and
S :=
1
σ2(q + δ2)
[
q2 − δ2
q(1− δ2) log
q − δ
q + δ
+ log
1 + δ
1− δ
]
.
The proof is by induction on j. First, consider j = 1. We have, for any t ∈ R+,
E
[
τi ∧ t− τi−1 ∧ t | FWτi−1
]
= − 2
σ
E
[
Wτi∧t −Wτi−1∧t −
σ
2
(τi ∧ t− τi−1 ∧ t) | FWτi−1
]
by Theorem 7.29 Kallenberg (2002). Observe that the left hand side is monotonically increasing in
t and the right hand side takes values in the interval
[
− 2
σ2
a
(
q
φi−1 + 1− q
)
,− 2
σ2
b
(
q
φi−1 + 1− q
)]
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and is therefore bounded. Thus, taking the limit as t → ∞ and applying the Monotone Convergence
Theorem (to the left hand side) and the Dominated Convergence Theorem (to the right hand side)
yields:
E
[
τi − τi−1 | FWτi−1
]
= − 2σE
[
Wτi −Wτi−1 − σ2 (τi − τi−1) | FWτi−1
]
= − 2
σ2
E
[
a
(
q
φi−1 + 1− q
)
1{
φi=
q
q−δ
} + b
(
q
φi−1 + 1− q
)
1{
φi=
q
q+δ
} | FWτi−1
]
= − 2
σ2
[
a
(
q
φi−1 + 1− q
)
P
[
φi =
q
q−δ | φi−1
]
+ b
(
q
φi−1 + 1− q
)
P
[
φi =
q
q+δ | φi−1
]]
= μτ +
{
S(q + δ)(1 + δ), if φi−1 = qq−δ
−S(q − δ)(1− δ), if φi−1 = qq+δ
,
where the second equality is due to the deﬁnition of τi in Theorem 7, the third one is due to the fact
that φ is Markov, and the last one is obtained via direct calculations by employing the conditional
probabilities of Corollary 1.
Next, suppose that the statement of the induction is true for j = n. Let j = n+ 1 and observe
that for any i > j we have
E
[
τi − τi−1 | FWτi−(n+1)
]
= E
[
E
[
τi − τi−1 | FWτi−n
]
| FWτi−n−1
]
= μτ + S
(
q2−δ2
q(1−δ2)
)n−1
E
[
(q + δ)(1 + δ)1{
φi−n= qq−δ
} − (q − δ)(1− δ)1{
φi−n= qq+δ
} | φi−n−1
]
,
where the last equality is due to the assumption of the induction and the fact that φ is Markov.
Using as before the conditional probabilities given in Corollary 1, direct calculation proves that the
conjecture holds.
Next, note that τn − τn−1 − μτ is a L2 mixingale since24
∥∥∥E [τi − τi−1 − μτ | FWτi−n]
∥∥∥
2
= S
(
q2−δ2
q(1−δ2)
)n−1 [
E
(
(q + δ)(1 + δ)1{
φi−n= qq−δ
}
−(q − δ)(1− δ)1{
φi−n= qq+δ
}
)2] 12
≤ S√2(q + δ)(1 + δ)
(
q2−δ2
q(1−δ2)
)n−1
,
where the ﬁrst equality is due to the result above and the inequality is due the fact that (a+ b)2 ≤
2(a2 + b2). Moreover, let cn = c = S
√
2(q + δ)(1 + δ) and Ψ(n) =
(
q2−δ2
q(1−δ2)
)n−1
and observe that
Ψ(n) = o(log−2(n)). Hence, by Corollary 1 of de Jong (1995), we have that
τn
n
−→
n→∞ μτ a.s.
The second statement of the Lemma is proved by contradiction. Fix an ω ∈ {ω ∈ Ω :
limn→∞
τn(ω)
n = μτ}. Suppose that for this ω there exists a sequence {ti}∞i=1 such that limi→∞ ti =
∞ and limi→∞ L
p
ti
(ω)
ti
= K 	= 1μτ , where K can take inﬁnity as a value.
24For a deﬁnition of mixingales see e.g. de Jong (1995).
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If K = +∞, then for any M ∈ R+ there exists an N ∈ N such that for any n ≥ N we have
Lptn(ω)
tn
> M ⇔ τMtn(ω) < tn ⇔
τMtn(ω)
Mtn <
tn
Mtn
where the operator · returns the largest integer smaller than its argument. Taking the limit yields
that limn→∞
τMtn(ω)
Mtn ≤ 1M for any M ∈ R+ and, therefore, is equal to zero, which contradicts the
choice of ω as, evidently, μτ 	= 0.
If K < +∞, we have two possibilities: either K < 1μτ or K > 1μτ . We will consider only the
ﬁrst case as the second one can be dealt with in similar manner.
Fix an ε = 14
(
1
μτ
−K
)
. As limi→∞
Lpti
(ω)
ti
= K there exists an N ∈ N such that, for any n ≥ N ,
we have
Lptn (ω)
tn
−K < ε. Observe that we have
Lptn(ω) < tn(ε+K) ⇔ τtn(ε+K)+1(ω) > tn ⇔
τtn(ε+K)+1(ω)
tn(ε+K)+ 1 >
tn
tn(ε+K)+ 1 .
Taking the limit yields that limn→∞
τtn(ε+K)+1(ω)
tn(ε+K)+1 ≥ 1ε+K > μτ due to the choice of ε, which
contradicts the choice of ω .
Thus, for any ω ∈ {ω ∈ Ω : limn→∞ τn(ω)n = μτ} we have limt→∞ Lt(ω)t = 1μτ .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 9
To prove Proposition 9 we ﬁrst need to establish a few auxiliary results.
Deﬁnition 2 (Most Recent Common Ancestor) Consider yni deﬁned in Equations (28)-(31).
We deﬁne the most recent common ancestor of yni and y
n
j , A
(
yni , y
n
j
)
, recursively as follows
A (yni , yni ) = i,
A (yni , ynj ) = A (ynj , yni ) = 1{i>j} i−1∑
k=0
ζi−1,kA
(
ynj , y
n
k
)
+ 1{i<j}
j−1∑
k=0
ζj−1,kA (ynk , yni ) .
Lemma 7 Suppose q < 1, then for any i ≥ j ≥ k ≥ 0, and any a ∈
(
max
{√
q,
√
q4
4 + 2q − q
2
2
}
, 1
)
we have
P¯
(A (yni , ynj ) = k) ≤ ca2j−i−k.
where c = a−2M > 1, andM is the smallest nonnegative integerm such that qs+qs+(1−2s)m
(
1− qs+1) <
1,25 with s < 1/2 being the solution of a = qs.
25Such M exists since
lim
m→∞ q
s + qs+(1−2s)m
(
1− qs+1) = qs < 1.
Moreover, note that for all m ≥ M
qs + qs+(1−2s)m
(
1− qs+1) < 1
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the maximum of i and j.
Suppose that max {i, j} = n ≤ M . Then the assumption of mathematical indiction holds since
P¯
(A (yni , ynj ) = k) ≤ 1 ≤ ca2j ≤ ca2j−i−k
due to the deﬁnition of c.
Suppose that for max {i, j} = m ≥ M the assumption of induction holds. Consider max {i, j} =
i = m+ 1, then we have the following four cases.
1. k 	= 0, k 	= j.
P¯
(A (ynm+1, ynj ) = k) = P¯
(
m∑
l=0
ζm,lA
(
ynl , y
n
j
)
= k
)
=
m∑
l=0
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) P¯ (ζm,l = 1)
=
m∑
l=k
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) P¯ (ζm,l = 1) =
m∑
l=k
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) (1− q) qm−l
where the third equality is due to the fact that the common ancestor A
(
ynl , y
n
j
)
≤ min {l, j},
and the fourth follows from the deﬁnition of ζ in Equation (31). Then
P¯
(A (ynm+1, ynj ) = k) =
j−1∑
l=k
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) (1− q) qm−l +
m∑
l=j+1
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) (1− q) qm−l
≤ (1− q) c
⎛
⎝ j∑
l=k
a2l−j−kqm−l +
m∑
l=j+1
a2j−l−kqm−l
⎞
⎠
=
(1− q) c
(1− aq) (a2 − q)
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩a
2j−m−k (a2 − q)+ ak−jqm+1−k (aq − 1)
negative for a<1
+
[
qm−jaj−k
(−aq2 + 2q − a2)]
negative for a>
√
q4
4
+2q− q2
2
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
≤ (1− q) c
(1− aq) (a2 − q)
{
a2j−m−k
(
a2 − q)} = (1− q) c
(1− aq)a
2j−m−k ≤ ca2j−m−k−1
where the ﬁrst equality comes from k 	= j, the ﬁrst inequality follows from the principle of
mathematical induction and the last inequality follows from the conditions on a.26
2. k 	= 0, k = j.
P¯
(A (ynm+1, ynj ) = k) = P¯
(
m∑
l=0
ζm,lA
(
ynl , y
n
j
)
= k
)
=
m∑
l=0
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) P¯ (ζm,l = 1)
=
m∑
l=j
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) P¯ (ζm,l = 1) = m∑
l=j+1
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) (1− q) qm−l + (1− q) qm−k
since the left hand side is monotone in m.
26Since
√
q4
4 + 2q − q
2
2 < 1 there exists an a satisfying the conditions in Lemma 7.
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where the last equality is due to P¯ (A (ynk , ynk ) = k) = 1. By induction we have
(1− q)
⎡
⎣ m∑
l=j+1
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = k) qm−l + qm−k
⎤
⎦ ≤ c (1− q)
⎧⎨
⎩
m∑
l=j+1
a2j−l−kqm−l + qm−k
⎫⎬
⎭
= c (1− q) ak−m−1
{
a− a−k+m+2qm−k+1
(1− aq)
}
≤ a (1− q)
(1− aq) ca
k−m−1 ≤ cak−m−1
3. k = 0, k 	= j.
P¯
(A (ynm+1, ynj ) = 0) = P¯
(
m∑
l=0
ζm,lA
(
ynl , y
n
j
)
= 0
)
=
m∑
l=0
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = 0) P¯ (ζm,l = 1)
=
j−1∑
l=1
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = 0) (1− q) qm−l + m∑
l=j+1
P¯
(A (ynl , ynj ) = 0) (1− q) qm−l
+ P¯
(A (yn0 , ynj ) = 0) qm
where the last term follows from the deﬁnition of ζ in Equation (31). By induction
P¯
(A (ynm+1, ynj ) = 0) ≤ c (1− q)
⎧⎨
⎩
j−1∑
l=1
a2l−jqm−l +
m∑
l=j+1
a2j−lqm−l
⎫⎬
⎭+ ca−jqm
= c (1− q)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
qm−jaj
qja2−2j (aq − 1)− aq2 − a2 + 2q
(a2 − q) (1− aq)
negative for: 1>a>
√
q4
4
+2q− q2
2
+
a2j−m
1− aq
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
+ ca−jqm
≤ c
{
(1− q) a
2j−m
1− aq + a
−jqm
}
= ca2j−m−1
{
(1− q) a
1− aq + a
m−3j+1qm
}
The proof of this case is completed by showing that the last term above is smaller than 1,
and this is the case if
a+ am−3j+1qm − am−3j+2qm+1 < 1.
Note that a = qs, for some s < 1/2, hence
a+ am−3j+1qm − am−3j+2qm+1 < qs + qs+(1−2s)m (1− qs+1) < 1
where the ﬁrst inequality is due to m ≥ j, and the second is due to m ≥ M .
4. k = j = 0.
P¯
(A (ynm+1, yn0 ) = 0) = 1 < ca−m−1 = a−2M−m−1.
Hence by the principle of mathematical induction the statement of the Lemma holds for all m.
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Lemma 8 Let ψ denote
ψni = E
[
Y¯ nT |Hni
]− E [Y¯ nT |Hni−1] (69)
where E denotes expectations taken with respect to the measure P¯ and Hni := F
n
θni
with Fnt :=
σ
{
Y¯ ns≤t
}
. Denote the variance of ψ with
(
σψn,i
)2
= E
[
(ψni )
2
]
. The following holds for any t ≥ 0:
1. limn→∞ max
i≤Nnt
σψn,i = 0.
2. The set
Kψ :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(ψni )
2(
σψn,i
)2 , n ∈ N, i ≤ Nnt
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
is uniformly integrable.
3. For any k > 0
lim
n→∞ P¯
[
max
i≤Nnt
|ψni | > k
]
= 0
Proof of Lemma 8. We prove the assertions of the Lemma in the same order as stated.
1. Note that from Lemma 4 and the deﬁnition of Y¯ we have
E
[
Y¯ nT |Hni
]
= (1− q) [yni + μ (T − θni )] + qE
[
Y¯ nT |Hni−1
]
,
from which it follows that
ψni
1− q = [y
n
i − μθni −D0]−
i−1∑
j=1
ψnj , (70)
therefore (
σψn,i
)2
(1− q)2 = σ
2θni −
i−1∑
j=1
(
σψn,j
)2
.
Thus, by induction (
σψn,i
)2
(1− q)2 = σ
2
i∑
j=1
{
[q (2− q)]i−j Δnj,j−1
}
(71)
where Δnj,j−1 := θ
n
j − θnj−1and note that q (2− q) < 1 for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Fix any ω ∈ Ω, than from Ω3 it follows that there exists a k (ω) such that nΔnj,j−1 <
2 log (j) for any j ≥ k. Moreover, from Ω4 we have that limn→∞ N
n
T
n = λT . Therefore from
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equation (71) we have
(
σψn,i
)2
= (1− q)2 σ2
i∑
j=1
{
[q (2− q)]i−j Δnj,j−1
}
< (1− q)2 σ2
⎧⎨
⎩
k−1∑
j=1
{
[q (2− q)]i−j Δnj,j−1
}
+
2
n
i∑
j=k
[q (2− q)]i−j log (j)
⎫⎬
⎭
< (1− q)2 σ2
⎧⎨
⎩
k−1∑
j=1
Δnj,j−1 +
2
n
log (i)
i∑
j=k
[q (2− q)]i−j
⎫⎬
⎭
= (1− q)2 σ2
⎧⎨
⎩
k−1∑
j=1
Δnj,j−1 +
2
n
log (i)
i∑
j=k
[q (2− q)]i−j
⎫⎬
⎭
= (1− q)2 σ2
⎧⎨
⎩
k−1∑
j=1
Δnj,j−1 +
2
n
log (i)
1− [q (2− q)]i−k+1
1− [q (2− q)]
⎫⎬
⎭
< (1− q)2 σ2
⎧⎨
⎩
k−1∑
j=1
Δnj,j−1 +
2
n
log (NnT )
1
1− [q (2− q)]
⎫⎬
⎭
= (1− q)2 σ2
⎧⎨
⎩
k−1∑
j=1
Δj,j−1
n
+
2
n
log (NnT )
1
1− [q (2− q)]
⎫⎬
⎭
∴
(
σψn,i
)2
= (1− q)2 σ2
i∑
j=1
{
[q (2− q)]i−j Δnj,j−1
}
(72)
≤ (1− q)2 σ2
⎧⎨
⎩
k−1∑
j=1
Δj,j−1
n
+
2
n
log (NnT )
1
1− [q (2− q)]
⎫⎬
⎭
Note that the right hand side does not depend on i and its limit as n → ∞ is zero. Thus
limn→∞ max
i≤Nnt
σψn,i = 0.
2. Consider
(
κψn,i
)4
:= E
[
(ψni )
4
]
and note that from Equation (70) at arrival i and i − 1, it
follows that (
κψn,i
)4 ≤ (1− q)4 E [(yni − yni−1 − μΔni,i−1)4]
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= σ4 (1− q)4
i−1∑
j=0
P¯
(A (yni , yni−1) = j)E
[(√
Δni,jηi,j −
√
Δni−1,jηi−1,j
)4]
= 3σ4 (1− q)4
i−1∑
j=0
P¯
(A (yni , yni−1) = j)
⎡
⎣θni − θni−1 + 2 i−1∑
k=j+1
(
θnk − θnk−1
)⎤⎦
2
≤ 12σ4 (1− q)4
i−1∑
j=0
P¯
(A (yni , yni−1) = j) (i− j − 1) i∑
k=j+1
(
θnk − θnk−1
)2
≤ 12σ4 (1− q)4 c
i−1∑
j=0
i∑
k=j+1
ai−j−2 (i− j) (θnk − θnk−1)2
= 12σ4 (1− q)4 ca−2
i∑
k=1
(
θnk − θnk−1
)2 k−1∑
j=0
ai−j (i− k − (j − k))
≤ 12σ4 (1− q)4 ca−2
i∑
k=1
(
θnk − θnk−1
)2
ai−k
⎡
⎣(i− k) k∑
j=0
ak−j −
k∑
j=0
ak−j (j − k)
⎤
⎦
= 12σ4 (1− q)4 ca−2
i∑
k=1
(
θnk − θnk−1
)2
ai−k
[
(i− k)
k∑
l=0
al +
k∑
l=0
all
]
where the ﬁrst equality follows form the deﬁnition of yni , the second from the fact that ηi,j
is and iid standard normal and the deﬁnition of Δni,j , while the second inequality comes for
the observation that
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 ai
)2 ≤ 1n∑ni=1 a2i and the third inequality follows from Lemma
7, the third equality is simply a change in the summations order, the third inequality comes
from having added one nonnegative element to the sum over j, and ﬁnally the last equality
is obtained setting l = k − j.
Note that for any b ∈ (a, 1) there exists a constant c1 such that(
x+
a
1− a
)(a
b
)x ≤ c1 ∀x ∈ [0,∞).
Therefore
(
κψn,i
)4 ≤ 12σ4 (1− q)4 ca−2
1− a
i∑
k=1
(
θnk − θnk−1
)2
ai−k
[
(i− k) + a
1− a
]
≤ c2
i∑
k=1
(
θnk − θnk−1
)2
bi−k
(73)
where c2 := 12σ
4 (1− q)4 ca−2c1/ (1− a) .
Now to prove that the set Kψ is almost surely uniformly integrable we need to show
sup
n,i
(
κψn,i
)4
(
σψn,i
)4 < ∞.
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From Equations (71) and (73) we have
(
κψn,i
)4
(
σψn,i
)4 ≤ c3
∑i
j=1
(
θnj − θnj−1
)2
bi−j{∑i
j=1 [q (2− q)]i−j
(
θnj − θnj−1
)}2 ≤ c3
∑i
j=1 b
i−j
(
θnj − θnj−1
)2
∑i
j=1 b
i−j
1
(
θnj − θnj−1
)2 (74)
= c3
∑i
j=1 b
i−j (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2∑i
j=1 b
i−j
1 (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2
(75)
where c3 := c2/ (1− q)4 σ4 and b1 := [q (2− q)]2 and the last equality follows from Equa-
tion (27).
Now consider a random variable Xi with distribution given by
P¯
(
Xi =
i− j
i
)
=
(γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2∑i
j=1 (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2
.
Then, for any s ∈ [0, 1], we have the cumulative distribution function
Fi (s) = P¯ (Xi ≤ s) =
∑si
j=1 (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2∑i
j=1 (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2
and, given the regularity condition Ω1, this cdf is such that limi→∞ Fi (s) = s. Therefore,
from Theorem III.1.2 of Shiryaev (1996) we have that Xi weakly converges to a uniform
random variable, i.e. Xi
w−→
i→∞
X ∼ U (0, 1), and in particular
lim
i→∞
E
[
e−kXi
]
=
1− e−k
k
∀k > 0.
Now notice that, using the deﬁnition of Xi, the ratio in Equation (75) can be rewritten as
∑i
j=1 b
i−j (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2∑i
j=1 b
i−j
1 (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2
=
E
[
eiXi ln b
]
E [eiXi ln b1 ]
where ln b and ln b1 are both negative. Therefore, to establish uniform integrability ofK
ψ it is
suﬃcient to show uniform convergence of E
[
e−kXi
]
in k. To do so consider the following class
of equicontinuous, uniformly bounded functions S :=
{
s : R+ → R+ : s (x) = e−kxk , k ∈ [1,∞)
}
.
Then, from Theorem III.8.3 of Shiryaev (1996), we have that
lim
i→∞
sup
k∈[1,∞)
∣∣∣∣E
[
e−kXi
k
]
−
(
1− e−k
)∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Therefore, for any  ∈ (0, 1), there exists a ı¯ such that for any i ≥ ı¯
∑i
j=1 b
i−j (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2∑i
j=1 b
i−j
1 (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2
≤ ln b
ln b1
(1 + ) .
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Thus
sup
n,i
(
κψn,i
)4
(
σψn,i
)4 ≤ c3 sup
i
∑i
j=1 b
i−j (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2∑i
j=1 b
i−j
1 (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2
≤ c3max
{
ln b
ln b1
(1 + ) ,max
i≤ı¯
∑i
j=1 b
i−j (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2∑i
j=1 b
i−j
1 (γ¯j − γ¯j−1)2
}
< ∞,
implying that Kψ is uniformly integrable.
3. To prove that for any k > 0, limn→∞ P¯
[
max
i≤Nnt
|ψni | > k
]
= 0, ﬁrst observe that from Equa-
tion (73), due to the regularity condition Ω3, there exists an ı¯ < ∞ such that
E
[
(ψni )
4
]
≡
(
κψn,i
)4 ≤ c2 i∑
k=1
(
θnk − θnk−1
)2
bi−k =
c2
n2
i∑
k=1
(γ¯k − γ¯k−1)2 bi−k
≤ c2
n2
[
ı¯∑
k=1
(γ¯k − γ¯k−1)2 bi−k + 4
i∑
k=ı¯+1
(ln k)2 bi−k
]
≤ c2
n2
[
ı¯∑
k=1
(γ¯k − γ¯k−1)2 + 4 (ln i)
2
1− b
]
.
(76)
Consider a random variable χ (n) given by χ (n) := argmax
j≤n
∣∣∣ψnj ∣∣∣ . Then
P¯
[
max
i≤Nnt
|ψni | > k
]
=
∑
i≤Nnt
P¯ [ψni > k|χ (Nnt ) = i] P¯ (χ (Nnt ) = i)
≤
∑
i≤Nnt
E
[
(ψni )
2 |χ (Nnt ) = i
]
P¯ (χ (Nnt ) = i)
k2
=
∑
i≤Nnt
E
[
(ψni )
2 1{χ(Nnt )=i}
]
k2
≤
∑
i≤Nnt
{
E
[
(ψni )
4
]
P¯ (χ (Nnt ) = i)
}1/2
k2
≤ c
1/2
2
k2
[
1
Nnt
ı¯∑
k=1
(γ¯k − γ¯k−1)2 + 4 (lnN
n
t )
2
Nnt (1− b)
]1/2
Nnt
n
Where the ﬁrst inequality is the Chebyshev’s inequality, the second inequality is the Cauchy-
Buniakovsky inequality, the third inequality comes from Equation (76) and the observation
that
∑n
i=1 x
1/2
i ≤
√
n (
∑n
i=1 xi)
1/2 .
Hence from Ω2, Ω4 and the fact that limx→∞ (lnx)2 /x = 0, we ﬁnally have
lim
n→∞ P¯
[
max
i≤Nnt
|ψni | > k
]
= 0
as claimed.
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Lemma 9 Consider yni deﬁned in deﬁned in Equations (28)-(31). Then
P¯
[
yni ≤ y|yni−k, ..., yn0
]
= (1− q)
i−k∑
j=1
qi−k−jP¯
[
ynj + ε
n
i,j ≤ y|ynj
]
+ qi−kP¯
[
yn0 + ε
n
i,0 ≤ y|yn0
]
.
Proof. The proof is by the principle of mathematical induction. For k = 1 the statement is
trivially true given the deﬁnition of yni . Suppose the statement holds for k = m, that is
P¯
[
yni ≤ y|yni−m, ..., yn0
]
= (1− q)
i−m∑
j=1
qi−m−jP¯
[
ynj + ε
n
i,j ≤ y|ynj
]
+ qi−mP¯
[
yn0 + ε
n
i,0 ≤ y|yn0
]
.
We than have that for k = m+ 1
P¯
[
yni ≤ y|yni−m−1, ..., yn0
]
= E
[
E
[
1{yni ≤y}
∣∣∣ yni−m, ..., yn0 ]∣∣∣ yni−m−1, ..., yn0 ]
= E
⎡
⎣(1− q) i−m∑
j=1
qi−m−jP¯
[
ynj + ε
n
i,j ≤ y|ynj
]
+ qi−mP¯
[
yn0 + ε
n
i,0 ≤ y
∣∣ yn0 ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ yni−m−1, ..., yn0
⎤
⎦
= (1− q)E
[
E
[
1{yni−m+εni,i−m≤y}
∣∣∣ yni−m]∣∣∣ yni−m−1, ..., yn0 ] (77)
+ (1− q)
i−m−1∑
j=1
qi−m−jP¯
[
ynj + ε
n
i,j ≤ y
∣∣ ynj ]+ qi−mP¯ [yn0 + εni,0 ≤ y∣∣ yn0 ] .
Note that
E
[
E
[
1{yni−m+εni,i−m≤y}
∣∣∣ yni−m]∣∣∣ yni−m−1, ..., yn0 ] = E [E [1{yni−m+εni,i−m≤y}
∣∣∣ yni−m, ..., yn0 ]∣∣∣ yni−m−1, ..., yn0 ]
= E
[
E
[
1{yni−m≤y−εni,i−m}
∣∣∣ yni−m−1, ..., yn0 , εni,i−m]∣∣∣ yni−m−1, ..., yn0 ]
= (1− q)
i−m−1∑
j=1
qi−m−1−jP¯
[
ynj + ε
n
i−m,j + ε
n
i,i−m ≤ y|ynj
]
+ qi−m−1P¯
[
yn0 + ε
n
i,0 ≤ y|yn0
]
= (1− q)
i−m−1∑
j=1
qi−m−1−jP¯
[
ynj + ε
n
i,j ≤ y|ynj
]
+ qi−m−1P¯
[
yn0 + ε
n
i,0 ≤ y|yn0
]
,
where the ﬁrst two equalities come from the independence of ε, the third comes form the statement
of the induction with i = i −m, m = 1 and y = y − ε, and the last comes from the Gaussianity
and independence of ε. Combining this result with equation (77) yields
P¯
[
yni ≤ y|yni−m−1, ..., yn0
]
= (1− q)
i−m−1∑
j=1
qi−m−1−jP¯
[
ynj + ε
n
i,j ≤ y|ynj
]
+qi−m−1P¯
[
yn0 + ε
n
i,0 ≤ y|yn0
]
.
QED.
We now can establish Proposition 9.
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Proof of Proposition 9. The proof of the proposition proceeds as follows. First, we establish
the tightness of Y¯ n in Skorokhod topology, and the fact that the limiting process is a continuos
local martingale. Second, we establish the joint tightness of the processes Y¯ n, eY¯
n
, and θ¯n, where
θ¯nt := θ
n
Nnt
. Third, we identify the limiting processes.
To establish tightness of Y¯ n, consider Mnt :=
∑Nnt
i=1 ψ
n
i where ψ
n
i is deﬁned in Lemma 8. Due
to Lemma 8 and Theorem 2.4 of McLeish (1977), the sequence of processes (Mn,Fn) is tight27
in Stone (1963) topology for q ∈ (0, 1). Since by deﬁnition Stone’s topology is equivalent to
Skorokhod topology on D ([0, T ]) (the space of ca´dla´g processes in the [0, T ] interval), (Mn,Fn) is
tight in Skorokhod topology as well.
Moreover, since by Lemma 8
lim
n→∞ P¯
(
max
t≤K
|ΔMnt | > k
)
= lim
n→∞ P¯
(
max
i≤Nnk
|ψni | > k
)
= 0, (78)
and the sequence Mn is tight we have that it is C-tight, that is all limit points of the sequence{L¯ (Mn)} are laws of continuos processes (see Proposition VI.3.26 Jacod and Shiryaev (2003)).
Furthermore, consider any convergent subsequence of Mn, Mnk , then by Equation (78) and
the Borel-Cantelli Lemma there exist a further subsequence, denoted for simplicity by n, such
that maxt≤NnT |ΔMnt | → 0 a.s. P¯. Therefore, it there exists m and c such that for all n ≥ m,
|ΔMnt | ≤ c ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, the limit process of (Mn,Fn) is a local martingale (see Proposition
IX.1.17 Jacod and Shiryaev (2003)). Finally, since the choice of the converging subsequence was
arbitrary, we have that all the limits of (Mn,Fn) are continuos local martingales.
Note that from Lemma 4 and the deﬁnition of Y¯ we have
E
[
Y¯ nT |Hni
]
= (1− q) [yni + μ (T − θni )] + qE
[
Y¯ nT |Hni−1
]
.
Since
Nnt∑
i=1
ψni = E
[
Y¯ nT |HnNnt
]
− E [Y¯ nT |Hn0 ] = E [Y¯ nT |HnNnt
]
− μT
it follows that
Y¯ nt − μT =
Nnt −1∑
i=1
ψni +
q
1− qψ
n
Nnt
= Mnt +
2q − 1
1− q ψ
n
Nnt
.
Due to condition (78), and the fact thatMnt is C-tight and its limit is a continuous local martingale,
we have from Lemma VI.3.31 and Proposition VI.3.17 of Jacod and Shiryaev (2003), that Y¯ nt is
also C-tight and its limit is a continuous local martingale.
We now turn to the joint tightness of Y¯ n, eY¯
n
and θ¯n. Observe that θ¯n, given the deﬁnition of
θn, is such that
θ¯nt =
Nnt∑
i=1
γ¯i − γ¯i−1
n
→ t for all t ∈ [0, T ] , ω ∈ Ω.
27See page 309 of Kallenberg (2002).
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Moreover,
Nnt∑
i=1
(γ¯i − γ¯i−1)2
n2
→ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] , ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, by Theorem VI.2.2.15 of Jacod and Shiryaev (2003) we have that θ¯n → θ¯ in Skorokhod
topology where θ¯t = t.
Consider now any convergent subsequence of Y¯ n, without loss of generality let it be denoted
by n, then it follows form the tightness result that there exist a continuous local martingale Y¯
such that L (Y¯ n) → L (Y¯ ) . Since g : D ([0, T ]) → D ([0, T ]) : g (xt) = ext is a continuos map
for continuos processes in Skorokhod topology,28 by Proposition VI.3.8.II of Jacod and Shiryaev
(2003), we have that L
(
eY¯
n
)
→ L
(
eY¯
)
. By Corollary VI.3.33b of Jacod and Shiryaev (2003),
we then have that the sequence
(
Y¯ n, eY¯
n
, θ¯n
)
is C-tight, and for any converging subsequence Y¯ n,
L
(
Y¯ n, eY¯
n
, θ¯n
)
→ L
(
Y¯ , eY¯ , θ¯
)
.
We can ﬁnally identify the limiting processes. Form the above it is clear that the only part
left to identify is Y¯ . Assume, wlog, that Y¯ n is a converging subsequence. Theorem III.8.1 of
Shiryaev (1996) states that we can deﬁne a probability space, and a sequence of processes Xn,
such that Xn → X almost surely in Skorokhod topology, and such that L (Y¯ n) = L (Xn) and
L (Y¯ ) = L (X). Therefore, since we are only interested in the distribution of Y¯ we can assume,
wlog, that Y¯ n converges to Y¯ not only in law, but also almost surely in Skorokhod topology.
By Lemma 9, we have that for any t > s > 0
P¯
[
Y¯ nt ≤ y|F Y¯
n
s
]
= P¯
[
ynNnt ≤ y − μ
(
T − θ¯nt
)∣∣∣ ynNns , ..., yn0
]
= (1− q)
Nns∑
j=1
qN
n
s −jP¯
[
y¯nj + σ
√
ΔnNnt ,j
ηNnt ,j ≤ y|y¯nj
]
+ qN
n
s P¯
[
y¯n0 + σ
√
ΔnNnt ,0
ηNnt ,0 ≤ y|y¯n0
]
= (1− q)
Nns∑
j=1
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
−∞
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx+ qN
n
s P¯
[
y¯n0 + σ
√
ΔnNnt ,0
ηNnt ,0 ≤ y|y¯n0
]
=
(
1− qNns ) ∫
y−Y¯ n
s
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
−∞
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx+ (1− q)
Nns −1∑
j=1
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
y−y¯n
Nns
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx
+ qN
n
s P¯
[
y¯n0 + σ
√
ΔnNnt ,0
ηNnt ,0 ≤ y|y¯n0
]
,
where the second equality comes from the deﬁnition of ε and y¯, the third equality comes from the
fact that η is an independent standard Gaussian. Note that, as n goes to inﬁnity, the last term
vanishes and
(
1− qNns ) ∫
y−Y¯ n
s
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
−∞
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx −→
n→∞
∫ y−Y¯s
σ
√
t−s
−∞
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx (79)
28Since the Skorohod topology becomes uniform for continuous processes, see e.g. Proposition VI.1.17b of
Jacod and Shiryaev (2003).
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due to the almost sure convergence of Y¯ n and Ω4 and Ω5.
Note also that
Nns −1∑
j=1
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
y−y¯n
Nns
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx
=
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
y−y¯n
Nns
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx+
Nn
s− 1√
n
−1∑
j=1
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
y−y¯n
Nns
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx
≤
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
y−y¯n
Nns
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx+
qΛ¯sn−
√
n
1− q ,
where the last term goes to zero, as n goes to inﬁnity, due to Ω4 and the ﬁrst term above can be
rewritten as
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
y−y¯n
Nns
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx
=
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
y−Y¯s
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx+
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
y−y¯n
j
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx. (80)
To show that the above vanishes in the limit, ﬁx an ω and consider any κ1, κ2 > 0. Notice that by
the continuity of Y¯ , there exists a κ3 ∈ (0, s) such that
∣∣Y¯s − Y¯u∣∣ ≤ κ1 for all u ∈ [s− κ3, s].
Observe that, for n big enough and j ∈
[
Nn
s− 1√
n
, Nns − 1
]
, we have
y¯nj = Y¯
n
u , u ∈ [s− κ3, s]
and, since Y¯ n converges almost surely in Skorokhod topology to a continuos process Y¯ , it also
converges in uniform topology on compact sets,
sup
u∈[s−κ3,s]
∣∣Y¯ nu − Y¯u∣∣ ≤ κ2.
Therefore,
y¯nj ∈
[
Y¯s − κ2 − κ1, Y¯s + κ2 + κ1
] ∀j ∈ [Nn
s− 1√
n
, Nns − 1
]
.
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To show that the ﬁrst term in equation (80) vanishes, notice that the above implies that
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
y−Y¯s
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx ≤
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j (κ1 + κ2)
σ
√
2πΔnNnt ,Nns
−→
n→∞
κ1 + κ2
σ (1− q)√2πt
due to Ω4 and Ω5. Since κ1 and κ2 are arbitrary, we have that
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
y−Y¯s
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx −→
n→∞ 0. (81)
To show that the second term in equation (80) vanishes, notice that for the same κ1, κ2 and κ3
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j
∫ y−y¯nj
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,j
y−y¯n
j
σ
√
Δn
Nnt ,N
n
s
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx ≤ 1
σ
√
2π
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j ∣∣y − y¯nj ∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1√
ΔnNnt ,j
− 1√
ΔnNnt ,Nns
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |y|+
∣∣Y¯s∣∣+ κ1 + κ2
σ
√
2πΔnNnt ,Nns− 1√
n
ΔnNnt ,Nns
∣∣∣∣∣ΔnNnt ,Nns −ΔnNnt ,Nns− 1√
n
∣∣∣∣∣√
ΔnNnt ,Nns− 1√
n
+
√
ΔnNnt ,Nns
Nns −1∑
j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j −→
n→∞ 0 (82)
Since, due to Ω4 and Ω5, Δ
n
Nnt ,N
n
s
→ t− s, ΔnNnt ,Nns− 1√
n
→ t− s, and∑Nns −1j=Nn
s− 1√
n
qN
n
s −j → 1/ (1− q).
Collecting the results in equations (79), (81) and (82) we have
P¯
[
Y¯ nt ≤ y|F Y¯
n
s
]
−→
n→∞
∫ y−Y¯s
σ
√
t−s
−∞
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx = P¯
[
Y¯t ≤ y|F Y¯s
]
.
We also trivially have that
P¯
[
Y¯ nt ≤ y
] −→
n→∞
∫ y−Y¯0
σ
√
t
−∞
e−
x2
2√
2π
dx = P¯
[
Y¯t ≤ y
]
.
Thus, by direct calculation we have
E
[
eY¯t−
σ2
2
t|F Y¯s
]
= eY¯ s−
σ2
2
s ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T,
hence eY¯t−
σ2
2
t is a martingale. By Exercise 3.3.38.ii of Karatzas and Shreve (1991), we have that〈
Y¯
〉
t
= σ2t. Therefore, by the Levy characterization of the Brownian motion (see e.g. Theorem
3.3.16 of Karatzas and Shreve (1991)), Y¯t = σWt where W is a standard Brownian motion. Since
the converging subsequence of Y¯ n was arbitrary, and sinceW is clearly independent of the particular
realisation of Λ¯, QED.
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